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Chapter 4
“Undecidably Equivocal” 
On “Todtnauberg” and Forgiveness
Pajari Räsänen
Paul Celan’s visit to Martin Heidegger’s famous cottage (“die Hütte”)
in the Black Forest village of Todtnauberg on July 25, 1967 has been
widely discussed and debated, and, especially more recently, also widely
documented. More and more primary and secondary lite rature relating
to the incident has been published and is constantly being published.
Various accounts exist of those who were present during Celan’s sojourn
in Freiburg and witnessed his meeting with Heidegger. �ere are letters
related to the visit.�ere are various versions and sketches of the poem
and other ﬁrst- and second-hand docu ments related to the encounter.
So today, it has become fairly easy to reconstruct the episode.
�e meeting at Todtnauberg, which has so forcefully captivated 
the thought and imagination not only of scholars in the ﬁ elds of 
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lite rary studies and philosophy, but also of writers of literary ﬁ ction 
and drama, was not exactly the only time the poet and the thinker 
met personally, but indeed part of their ﬁ rst “real-life,” face-to-face 
encounter. Here and now, we cannot and need not explore all the 
complex details of the personal, textual and intellectual relationship 
between them.1 But to condense everything into one word, ambiva-
lence would seem to be most appropriate: ambivalence on Celan’s part 
and toward Heidegger, and not so much the other way around.2
�e several letters to his wife and quite a few other documents 
conﬁrm, of course, the obvious fact that Celan had mixed feelings 
about meeting the German thinker, whose political engagement was 
debated animatedly also in the sixties. Before traveling to Freiburg to 
give a reading of his poems, Celan already knew Heidegger would be 
among his audience.3 Celan probably had been reading Heid egger’s
work already in the fourties, but veriﬁably at least since 1951 or ’52,
and kept reading his works both extensively and intensively for the 
rest of his life. Heidegger showed growing interest in Celan’s poetry 
at least since the late 1950s, but never published anything on him.
�e two pro bably also corresponded more than can be veriﬁ ed at least 
since 1956, when Heidegger sent the poet a copy of one of his es-
says on Hebel, possibly in response to a letter.4 �e great mutual in-
terest seems undenia ble, even though the relationship was, on Celan’s
part, just as undeniably sha dowed by Heidegger’s relative inability to 
deal with his own political adventure of 1933, his “inexcusable error”
as Heidegger himself, in a private conversation with Otto Pögge-
ler, judged his involvement with the National Socialist party. Not to 
mention his almost total silence with regard to the Holocaust. A si-
lence which, according to Vladimir Jankélévitch and a few others,
was even more inexcusable than the rectorship and party member-
ship themselves.5 On the other hand, to mention only one telling 
anec dote, Pöggeler, who was a personal friend of both Heidegger 
and Celan, has told that in a private conversation in 1969 Celan ve-
hemently objected to �eodor Adorno’s pamphlet against the Hei-
deggerian “jargon of authenticity” and defended Heidegger’s idiom.6
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Celan’s ambivalence must be reduced to neither mere attraction nor 
mere repulsion.
With respect to the abundant published material related to the 
Heidegger-Celan relationship, less and less room seems to be left 
for mere speculation on the exact circumstances that gave rise to the 
primary poetic document of their 1967 encounter, namely the poem 
“Todtnauberg.”  
Let us now read the poem as it was printed in the book Licht-
zwang (1970):
T
Arnika, Augentrost, der
Trunk aus dem Brunnen mit dem
Sternwürfel drauf,
in der
Hütte,
die in das Buch
– wessen Namen nahms auf
vor dem meinen?–,
die in dies Buch
geschriebene Zeile von
einer Hoﬀ nung, heute,
auf eines Denkenden
kommendes
Wort
im Herzen,
Waldwasen, uneingeebnet,
Orchis und Orchis, einzeln,
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Krudes, später, im Fahren,
deutlich,
der uns fährt, der Mensch,
der’s mit anhört,
die halb-
beschrittenen Knüppel-
pfade im Hochmoor,
Feuchtes,
viel.7
�e words in my title, “undecidably equivocal,” are borrowed from 
Jacques Derrida’s essay “To Forgive: �e Unforgivable and the Im-
prescriptible.”8 �ese words do not directly designate the poem’s equi-
vocality, at least if we restrict poetic equivocality to such elements as 
syntactic ambiguity and semantic multivalence. Rather than poetic 
equivocality in such a restricted sense, Derrida’s words address, in the 
few lines that mention “Todtnauberg,” the undecidable equivocality 
involved in any address of forgiveness. However, he also links the 
poem with the themes of gift and forgiveness in a paradoxical man-
ner: “Todtnauberg remains [...] to be read, to be received – as gift or 
forgiveness themselves, a gift and a forgiveness which are the poem 
before being, possibly, its themes or the theme of the poet’s disap-
pointed expectation” (“To Forgive,” p. 38). �is is of course by no 
means obvious at ﬁ rst sight.
�e earlier interpretations have often seen in the poem, as Der-
rida says, “the trace of a disappointed expectation, of Celan’s antici-
pation of a word from Heidegger that would have signiﬁed a pardon 
beseeched,” and more speciﬁcally, these interpretations used to be 
more or less in conformity with the “clear narration” ridiculed by
Derrida: “Celan-came, – H[eidegger]-did-not-ask-the-Jews-for-for-
giveness-in-the-name-of-the-Germans, – Celan-who-was-waiting-
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for-a-word-of-forgiveness, – a-‘pardon!,’ – a-request-for-forgiveness 
– left-disappointed-and-he-made-a-poem-of-it – he-recorded-it-in-
one-of-his-poems” (“To Forgive,” p. 36).
Derrida points out, in his brief remarks concerning the poem,
that he does not want to either “conﬁrm or invalidate” such an in-
terpretation, but “would like to suggest that forgiveness (granted or 
asked for), the address of forgiveness, must forever remain, if there is 
such a thing, undecidably equivocal” (p. 36).9
Among many others, Lacoue-Labarthe has – prudently aﬃ  rm-
ing that he does not actually know exactly which word Celan was 
expecting from Heidegger – suggested that it might have been “le 
mot pardon.”10 And of course, he must be right; actually this has
been conﬁrmed, as ﬁrmly as such things can be conﬁrmed, for in-
stance by an attestation by Jean Daive, who reports Celan having 
told him perso nally: “Je voulais l ’entendre me dire pardon et le convain-
cre de le dire publiquement.”11 On the other hand, a few days after the 
meeting, Celan wrote in a letter to his wife that he hoped that Hei-
degger would “pick up his pen and write a few pages echoing [their 
conversation] and also warning against resurgent Nazism.”12 So it
seems that we know the word already, the word to be expected from 
Heidegger, the word to come, the word that apparently never came.
Or do we?
Lacoue-Labarthe is actually himself the ﬁrst to repent his con-
jecture concerning “le mot pardon,” the ﬁrst to admit that he may 
have been wrong in thinking, for an instant, that this may have been 
the word Celan was expecting; and indeed, that this was the word
that Heidegger should have enounced. �e second part of La poésie 
comme expérience is entitled “La Mémoire des dates” and consists of 
twelve relatively brief texts marked with dates. If you turn the page to 
the table of contents, you discover that the last of these notes, dated 
“4 août 1984 (Gênes),” also bears the title “L’impardonnable.” It is a 
question of Heidegger’s “irreparable oﬀense,” which does not mean 
the declarations he made in 1933–1934 as the Rector of the Universi-
ty of Freiburg (statements which may be comprehensible, as Lacoue-
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Labarthe says, but nonetheless unapprovable in themselves), but his 
silence afterwards, concerning the genocide:
Le premier, il aurait dû dire quelque chose. Et j’ai eu tort de penser 
un instant qu’il suﬃsait de demander pardon. Cela est strictement 
impardonnable. Tel est ce qu’il fallait dire. (La poésie comme expéri-
ence, pp. 167-168)13
It is no wonder that Lacoue-Labarthe had second thoughts about 
his ﬁrst conjecture. And yet, judging by the circumstantial evidence 
(namely, at least Jean Daive’s testimony), this ﬁrst intuition was cor-
rect: Celan did have the word pardon in his mind. But what we do not 
know is whether perhaps Celan, too, came to have second thoughts.
And it is the poem itself which must count as our primary piece of 
evidence; not in order to speculate about the intentions of its author,
but perhaps in order to see how the poem situates us face to face with 
the word of forgiveness, as Lacoue-Labarthe says, face to face with “le 
mot pardon” (p. 58),14 its conditions of possibility or impossibility.
No doubt, Derrida’s essay “To Forgive” engages itself, besides 
the explicit dialogue with Jankélévitch, in an implicit dialogue also 
with Lacoue-Labarthe’s very impressive book, although this friend is 
not explicitly mentioned. �e period of hesitation or undecidedness 
between forgiveness and the unforgivable, or between the end of the 
ﬁ rst part (written in September 1983) and the end of the second, “à 
lire comme un post-scriptum, avec sa part – inévitable – de repentir,” as 
Lacoue-Labarthe himself characterizes it (p. 9), corresponds in its 
own way to the aporetics of Derrida’s work on “impossible forgive-
ness,” “forgiving the unforgivable,” “mad forgiveness.”
After discussing the anecdote and the text of the poem in the 
manner of a more traditional interpretation, we shall try to approach 
the poem with regard to the “extravagant” view of it as “a gift and a 
forgiveness” on a pre-thematic level.15
EoE_book.indb   130 9.2.2010   20:47:36
131
“Every poem is circumstantial”16
I will only sketch a few main lines of the anecdote. Celan gave a 
reading of his poems at the University of Freiburg, and Heidegger,
who had eagerly anticipated meeting the poet whose books he knew 
well, having also heard some details of his personal history,17 was 
there among the one thousand and two hundred listeners. He in-
vited Celan to visit his cottage the next day and the poet accepted.
�ose who attended the conversation between the two, the next day 
at Todtnauberg, in “the hut,” during their walk in the Black Forest or 
during their automobile ride later, have not been able to tell much.
According to Silvio Vietta, who accompanied them on their walk,
their conversation was rather reticent: the poet would step aside from 
the path and pick ﬂowers and impress his interlocutor by telling their 
names in German, in Latin and in Yiddish, but other issues were not 
touched upon.18 Hence the words Arnika, Augentrost and Orchis und 
Orchis in the poem. �e poet and the thinker seem to have also ex-
changed some words on Adalbert Stifter and on Emily Dickinson,
whose poems Celan had translated several years earlier.19
�e role of Gerhard Neumann in the anecdote is paradoxical.
He was then an assistant to professor Gerhart Baumann, whose book 
of reminiscences has been one of the most important sources for the 
circumstantial information. Neumann was the man, the human being 
(“der Mensch”), who drove the car and heard the conversation during 
the drive back to Freiburg, and who also told Celan, after the drive,
of his immediate impression, which was that this conversation, the 
words that the poem refers to as “coarse” and “clear,” “Krudes [...] deut-
lich,” were to have an epochal meaning. One would indeed expect that 
Neumann,20 the man whose presence the poem mentions, would have
something signiﬁcant to tell us about this talk in the car, a conver-
sation that he himself designated as epoch-making. However, Neu-
mann has reportedly been quite reluctant to share his observations 
concerning the exchange, and perhaps also doubtful about remember-
ing the details; reportedly, he recalls the “painful silence,” and yet he 
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also remembers that between the “long pauses” Celan asked whether 
Heidegger would soon publicly speak about his involvement with Na-
tional Socialism.21 Before the drive, Celan wrote a few words in the 
visitors’ book at Heidegger’s cottage, the line that the poem mentions 
and reproduces almost verbatim, only slightly transformed:
Ins Hüttenbuch, mit dem Blick auf den Brunnenstern,
mit einer Hoﬀnung auf ein kommendes Wort im Herzen
Am 25. Juli 1967  Paul Celan22
But these words themselves mention a word, an expected word, a 
yet unsaid word, a word to come and hoped for. So we know, as far 
as such a thing can be known, that the hope and expectation had to 
do with a statement concerning Nazism, also a resurgent Nazism,
as Celan wrote in the letter to his wife Gisèle, and with persuading 
Heidegger to request forgiveness. At the same time, of course, as for 
instance Hadrien France-Lanord remarks, Celan must have realized 
that “the words that request forgiveness cannot be themselves re-
quested” (Paul Celan et Martin Heidegger, p. 121). Even though we
seem to know that the hope concerned asking forgiveness both pri-
vately and in public, we do not know exactly which word Celan had 
in mind. We do not know it, because Celan himself did not know it.
We know, a priori as it were, that the expected word could not be dic-
tated by the poet; he could not put words into the thinker’s mouth,
let alone into his heart.23
While the hope for the word to come is quite unequivocal,
clear and distinct, also in the poem which expresses this wish quite 
unequivocally, this word to come is itself still opaque. Otherwise it 
would not be still “in the heart”: the hope is in the heart, but it is also 
necessary that the word to come resides in the heart, comes from the 
heart, into the heart that hopes for it. Such a personal heart-to-heart 
relation is one of the prerequisites for forgiveness, as Vladimir Janké-
lévitch invites us to observe.24
EoE_book.indb   132 9.2.2010   20:47:36
133
In spite of the well-spread rumour, the material recently published
seems to conﬁrm that Celan did not at all return from Todtn auberg
disappointed and down-hearted.25 It seems that his hope was not at all
thwarted, to the contrary. But it also seems indisputable that Celan was
eventually frustrated, as time went by and the word that would have
met with his expectations did not come. Poems are, as Celan has writ-
ten, gifts to the attentive; but his gift to Heidegger did not seem to gain
the proper attention it was desired to have.
Parallel to the anecdote runs the textual history of the poem.
Questions could be posed for instance concerning the diﬀ erences be-
t ween the version published in January 1968 and sent to Heidegger 
and the ﬁnal version in the book Lichtzwang. Only the limited sepa-
rate edition of the poem in January 1968, the one that Celan sent to 
Heidegger, contains a certain addition in parentheses, later eﬀ aced in 
preparation for the collection of poems entitled Lichtzwang (1970).
It is the phrase, divided by an enjambment: “Un-/gesäumt kommen-
des,” to come without delay; “un-/gesäumt,” with a hyphen and line-
break; John Felstiner has included this word in his translation. “Un-/
delayed,” as if there was a moment of hesitation, precisely a delay be-
t ween the preﬁx “un-” and “-delayed.”
�ere was another diﬀerence too, a tinier one, because while the
1968 printing just repeated the verse “die in das Buch” around the ques-
tion between the dashes, the second of these in the ﬁ nal 1970 version
reads “die in dies Buch / geschriebene Zeile.” It is as if the second of
these verses referred to the book Lichtzwang in saying “this book,” this
book which reiterates or insistently preserves the line of hope that was,
for the ﬁrst time, recorded in the guest book of the Hütte at Todtnau-
berg. It is as if the request for a word was now, in the absence of the de-
sired response, destined for the reader, the human being who still listens
into the conversation, the third party who is always already there for the
poetic conversation, and not just the one who drove the car.
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�e unspoken horizon
Both Hans-Georg Gadamer and, in an early interpretation, Otto
Pögge ler, assume that the word Krudes in the ﬁ fth strophe, “Krudes,
später, im Fahren,/ deutlich,” refers to something that Heidegger ei-
ther said to the poet or had written in his later works, something that
ﬁ rst appeared “crude” but later, during the conversation in the car, be-
came “clear,” “distinct” for his reader and interlocutor Celan.26 In the
light of all available circumstantial information this seems a misunder-
standing, of course. However, the syntax alone does not seem to pre-
clude this reading, it does not allow us to decide whether it was Hei-
degger or Celan whose words were “crude” or “coarse.” It could well be
that the “crudeness” becomes “later, while driving,/ clear,” and nothing
seems to prevent us from assuming that the “crude” word comes from
“the thinking man” from whom a word is expected to come. Actually,
Krudes seems to respond formally to kommendes, and perhaps this is no
mere formal coincidence. �rough this formal reﬂection, it could also
reﬂect the more reserved, more polite expression, the hope expressed by
a written line in the guest book in the third strophe, something that is
now suddenly expressed in a cruder, and as such, more distinct manner
during the drive.�e word “later [später]” responds to the earlier “today
[heute],” and even while the word “un-/delayed” has been erased, there
seems to be a certain dia lectic between the patient hope and the impa-
tient, even rude demand.�is impatience even transmits itself into the
syntax or, rather, asyndetic parataxis of the more and more singly spat-
tered words in the later strophes, and especially the violent rhythm of
the ﬁfth strophe, more or less like the rocking of a car while driving on
an “unleveled” road:
Krudes, später, im Fahren,
deutlich,
�e words themselves in this poem have a certain “crude” aspect.
Waldwasen brings along the synonym of Wasen which is Faschine, 
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“fascine” in English, a word with obvious assonances and etymologi-
cal connotations. In military jargon, fascines are “long cylindrical 
faggot[s] of brush or other small wood, ﬁrmly bound together at 
short intervals, used in ﬁlling up ditches, the construction of bat-
teries, etc.”27 Michael Hamburger must have had this in mind when 
translating, not Waldwasen but Knüppelpfade by “fascine walks”; so 
this is indeed an ingenious way to bring this allusion into the trans-
lation, even though it cannot be used directly for the word Waldwa-
sen. And since Wasen means not only grassy sward or turf, a mound 
covered with grass, and botanically, the root-structure of plants (thus 
the root-structure of the poem connects this word also with “Orchis 
und Orchis,” and the other ﬂowers mentioned), but also alludes, albeit 
only through this etymological connection, to fascine, this word Wald-
wasen is quasily synonymous with Knüppelpfade, which is an obvious 
parody of Heidegger’s title Holzwege. On the other hand, this “swell-
ing of the ground”28 covered with grass and often forest ﬂ owers, Was-
en is, according to the Grimm dictionary, not only favored by animals 
searching for food and by wanderers seeking a place of rest, but has 
also been addressed as man’s ﬁnal resting place.29 And this archaic and 
very polyvalent word sometimes “designates also a place where the 
carcasses and hides of animals were disposed of by a knacker.”30  What 
is more, through a metonymic displacement between the damp clod 
of earth and dampness itself, Wasen is also syno nymous to Feuchte, hu-
midity; thus it corresponds also to the penultimate word of the poem.
�e Grimm dictionary even quotes an Old Frisian use of the word
wasem for “der feuchte hauch aus dem munde,” “the moist breath out of 
the mouth” (DWB, Bd. 27, Sp. 2284).
� e word Knüppelpfade is not only a parody of Holzwege but also 
an allusion to the weapon, Knüppel, “bludgeon,” as an instrument of 
violence. �e title of the poem does not only allude to a “mountain of 
death,”31 nor only to the Todt organization, but perhaps also to the 
historical etymology of this toponym. As Marjorie Perloﬀ  remarks, “in 
1025 A.D. Emperor Henry II took the town from the French, who 
had originally called it ‘Toutenouua,’ or ‘all new.’”32 And indeed, if we
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look at the Grimm dictionary, we ﬁnd the entry  Todt enauge, a word to 
be found in one of Celan’s favourite lite rary sources, Jean Paul, who in 
the context speaks of death beds and “the eyes of the dead once more 
raised toward us [die blassen gestalten, die ihre todtenaugen noch ein-
mal gegen uns aufheben].”33 � is spectral allusion, as if concealed by a 
mountain of other voices, the -berg of Todtnauberg that is, would ﬁ nd 
its counterpoint in the word Augentrost on the ﬁ rst line.
Of course, the ﬂowers that begin the poem (Arnika, Augentrost) 
are not mentioned here simply because Celan happened to see them
blooming during his visit, and not only since they happen to be healing
plants. Arnika is supposed to heal bruises and Augentrost, “eyebright,”
as its name already suggests, “is a remedy for weak eyes,” with an “old
repu tation for ‘making old eyes young again.’”34 Lite rally, Augentrost
means a “consolation for the eyes.” �us we may surmise that these
healing plants are mirrored by two perhaps antagonistic elements in
the last two strophes: Knüppel may cause bruises; and moisture (Feuchte) 
can be caused by old age or sorrow, by a mote or cinder in the eye.
It is actually hard not to let all kinds of associations intervene,
while they frame the unspoken horizon of the encounter rather than 
accumulate into some kind of deﬁnite lexicon of its content. Perhaps 
the form matters more than the content here, since it is in principle 
enough to observe that an innumerable, inexhaustible multitude is in 
question; and form must here be understood, in Celan’s sense, as a 
vacancy and occupiability which makes further encounters possible.
“�e form of the poem,” writes Celan in one of his drafts for the Me-
ridian, “is the heart of the poet waiting for the poem.”35 �is is to say,
it seems to me, that the poem only becomes what it is in the encoun-
ter, in the “secret of the encounter [Geheimnis der Begegnung].”
Personal lived experience may always contribute to the reading 
of a poem, and this is indeed in accordance with Celan’s poetics of the 
encounter. Derrida attests to this fact by telling how he also signed 
the guest book, at Heidegger’s son’s request, “with as much anxiety,”
as he writes, “an anxiety that extended as much to all those in whose 
following, without knowing it, I signed, as to what I myself scribbled 
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in haste, both things likely to be equally at fault” (“To Forgive,” p. 38).
Such anxiety extends itself to all those in whose following you sign,
but no doubt, also to all those who shall follow you by signing, coun-
tersigning below your signature, as it were.
I had the opportunity, in June 2006, to visit Todtnauberg and 
also Heidegger’s native town Messkirch, where there is also a Hei-
degger Museum. A large cardboard poster with Celan’s poem printed 
on it actually greeted the visitors at the entrance. � e Brunnenstern
or Sternwürfel, the “star-die,” from above the well, had been taken 
there to be displayed.�e star-shaped cube turned out to be a perfect 
exam ple of multifacetedness, and indeed, when I gazed at this piece 
of woodwork from various angles, I also discovered that if you cover 
the nether part with the palm of your hand, looking obliquely upward 
at it, as if bowed down to draw water from the well, you can see the 
shape of the upper half of the Star of David. It has been suggested 
that the word Sternwürfel, referring to the wooden star-like cube or 
polyhedron attached upon the well of Heidegger’s cottage, might al-
lude to the Star of David; this is of course possible, but the motiva-
tion for such an allusion itself remains unclear.36
When writing the poem with the names of the healing plants 
and the allusion to “drinking the waters” for which the surroundings 
of Todtnauberg are famous (“Arnika, Augentrost, der Trunk/ aus dem 
Brunnen”), Celan may or may not have know that Heidegger had ac-
tually suggested, in a letter to Gerhart Baumann, that it might be 
“wholesome” for Celan to visit the Black Forest.37 Actually Celan 
and Heidegger met face to face the second time the following June 
in Freiburg.38 �is time, as the weather was more favorable, the poet’s
hope for a walk on the highland moor was realized.�ey met a third 
time, too, in March 1970, and Heidegger would have wanted to take 
the poet to see the Hölderlinian landscape of the Danube valley the 
next summer, arguing again that it would be beneﬁcial for the poet 
who had suﬀered from serious mental trouble.39 �ey never met again,
however. Celan drowned himself in the river Seine in April 1970,
more or less a month after they met the third and last time.40
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Silences
Let us not pretend that we know exactly what the painful silence and 
long pauses meant or had to mean, what was said between the lines,
so to say, in the car, or precisely which evasion was marked by these 
omissions, either in general or to the two parties of the conversa-
tion, accompanied or witnessed by a third party. Heidegger thanked 
Celan for the poem he had received early in 1968 in a letter. One or 
two enigmatic phrases concern this silence. Heidegger begins the let-
ter by asking: “How can I thank you for this grand, unexpected gift? 
[Wie soll ich Ihnen für dieses unerwartete große Geschenk danken?]” He 
refers to the evening of the poet’s “unforgettable reading” in Freiburg 
and their “initial greetings” in the hotel, and then continues, in Lyon’s
translation: “Since then we have exchanged a good deal of mutual 
silence.” Actually the original sentence verges on untranslatability:
“Seitdem haben wir Vieles einander zugeschwiegen.”41 � e capitali-
zed, nominalized Vieles responds, as it were, to the poem’s similar 
formulations: (1) to the present participle kommendes which is at-
tributed to Wort, (2) to Krudes which seems to refer to other words 
exchanged that were (or perhaps became, as some have viewed) also 
deutlich, and especially (3) to the pair of words “Feuchtes,/ viel,” whose 
reference seems even more uncertain. �e rare verb in Heidegger’s
letter, zuschwei gen, is hardly translatable; it corresponds to zusprechen
and zusagen, which both mean various forms of addressing the other 
(to promise or to aﬃrm, to speak forwardly and so on), but zuschwei-
gen means to address silence to someone; not exactly to address some-
thing by silen ce to someone, but to address silence to someone.
Silence need not be hostile, even when it is painful.42 While of 
course, the words in the car must have been “crude” and “clear”; and 
yet, silence and pauses cannot be interpreted in terms of messages and 
information, two terms that both Heidegger and Celan considered 
as adverse to the poetic nature of language. Celan himself uses, in his 
drafts for the Meridian, the verb anschweigen, which is quite close to 
zuschweigen; to address the unknown “�ou” by silence is to give this 
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“�ou” a chance, he writes.43 Yet, Heidegger’s letter may indeed have 
been a disappointment for Celan, with the thinker not taking this 
opportunity and mentioning anything about an “un-/delayed” word to 
come concerning National Socialism, but instead of that, addressing 
the poet with the well-meaning hope “�at at the appropriate hour 
you will hear the language in which what is to come forth as poet-
ry speaks to you.” However, after the word zugeschwiegen the letter 
also expresses a “thought” concerning a future conversation: “I think 
that someday some of it [that is, some of the mutual silence] will 
be redeemed from unspokenness through conversation. [Ich denke,
dass einiges noch eines Tages im Gespräch aus dem Ungesprochenen gelöst 
wird.]”44 �at did not seem to happen, though.
Is it not as if the whole poem ended up swallowed in the bog, in 
the dampness, and in the words Feuchtes, viel themselves? � e word
Feuchtes refers, of course, on the anecdotal level, to the highland moor 
and the rain that interrupted the walk on the Knüppelpfade, which 
must have turned slippery too, no doubt. Celan reportedly apologized 
that his shoes were not sturdy enough for such a walk. But the word
may refer to other things as well. Feuchtes echoes quite a few earlier 
words in the poem, ﬁrst of all kommendes and Krudes. As a word juxta-
posed with these two words that concern words, Feuchtes also refers 
to words, words including itself, as a word. Feuchtes is a humid word,
just as Krudes is a word that sounds crude. But it is certainly not just 
onomatopoetic. As I just suggested, it is as if the words of the poem,
not only kommendes and Krudes and all the words alluding to water 
and humidity, “Augentrost,/ der Trunk aus dem Brunnen [...] Waldwa-
sen, Knüppel-/pfade im Hochmoor,” ended up swallowed in “the much”
of humidity, “Feuchtes,/ viel,” not only these but also all the words in 
the poem, including the unspoken word which is still a word in the 
poem, as an expected word, the hoped-for word-to-come. And per-
haps the words “Feuchtes,/ viel” in this ﬁnal strophe also tell some-
thing of words in general? Instead of the “originary speaking” which 
had been an important Heideggerian theme for Celan, as it seems, in-
stead of the rivers and sources and fountainheads and valleys shaped 
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by the rivers, and nations founded by the poet’s word, this dampness 
of the bog, this dampness of the word Feuchtes, might mark a new 
poetics which is something quite diﬀerent from all sovereign layings 
of foundations.
Derrida cautiously suggests, that “the word ‘viel,’ many, innu-
merable, inﬁnitely numerous, [...] the last word of the poem [...] ap-
parently, or ﬁguratively, describes that which, like tracks or the humid 
thing (Feuchtes), is buried in the bog....” (“To Forgive,” p. 38). � at is,
“ﬁguratively” describes that which has lost all ﬁgure, all number, by
inﬁnite multiplication. Is it perhaps also a question of something or-
ganic deteriorating below the surface and emitting a “luminescence”
which, according to Otto Pöggeler’s account (cf. Der Stein hinterm 
Aug, p. 172), Celan was looking for when asking Heidegger to show 
him the highland moor, typical of the Black Forest?
Do these ﬁ nal words not also speak about silence, in their own 
way? Not only Heidegger’s silence, or the silence of expectation for a 
word to come, or the silence of the conspicuously absent voices who 
are still also spectrally present, but also the silence which ends the 
poem, any poem, the silence which belongs to the poem as its true 
envoi?
Words, like � owers
“Orchis und Orchis, einzeln”: here the word for “orchid” may stand for 
its etymological root. �e tuberoids of an orchid have the shape of 
testicles, hence the Greek name for the plant. And no doubt, these 
two singular pairs of testicles might stand, pars pro toto, for the two 
men having a walk in the Black Forest. Two singularities, two indi-
viduals trying to have a conversation, and at least one of them picking 
ﬂowers and naming them. �ese two both speak German as their 
mother tongue, but their dissimilar rootedness in this native lan-
guage also keeps them at a distance. A distance that both separates 
and brings them together.
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In another famous poem, “Radix, Matrix,” Celan speaks of an 
uprooted root, “rod and bulb,” a murdered Geschlecht – a famously un-
translatable word – standing black in the sky, “rod and testis”:
Wer,
wer wars, jenes
Geschlecht, jenes gemordete, jenes
schwarz in den Himmel stehende:
Rute und Hode –?
(Wurzel.
Wurzel Abrahams. Wurzel Jesse. Niemandes
Wurzel – o
unser.)45
As Werner Hamacher has argued, the second member of this pair,
Hode, can even be – and indeed must be – associated with the Latin
root of  this word, which is cunnus. � us Rute und Hode corresponds
to the asyndetic pair in the title “Radix, Matrix,” joining both sexes or, 
more equivocally, Geschlechter – a word for the constellation of quasi-
metonymical relations between sex and stock, gender and generation,
organs and ancestry.46 �e association, made at least by Bollack (“Vor
dem Gericht,” p. 138), with the word Orcus can only be suﬃ  ciently mo-
tivated by this detour through the deeply ambivalent cine reous constel-
lation intimated by the words “Orchis und Orchis, einzeln,” I think.
Orchis und Orchis are not just representantive ﬁgures for the 
dark conﬁguration of rootedness and uprootedness.�ey do not only
frame, for their part, the unspoken horizon of the man-to-man con-
versation either, the conspicous absence of the third party which still,
however, silently surrounds them, as if taking part in their reticent ex-
change. �ese underground tuberoids belong to the mentioned con-
ﬁguration just as any other true “words, like ﬂowers” belong to the 
fourfold mirror-play of the earth and sky, the gods and mortals, as 
Heidegger insists; or rather, they do not only “belong,” but  cons titute 
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the very Gegend (region) where these appear.�is belonging together 
that holds apart, this ineradicable relatedness, this inclusion and con-
tiguity drawing together and holding apart the members of the four-
fold is precisely what motivates Heidegger’s claim that Hölderlin’s
turn-of-phrase “Worte, wie Blumen” is no metaphor. Worte, wie Blu-
men – words, like ﬂowers are no mere metaphors, because they be-
long to the togetherness of earth and sky, mortals and immortals,
and not only belong to this mirror-play, but let the foursome appear,
take place.
In a very insightful passage of his essay concerning “Todtnauberg,” 
Axel Gellhaus points to the fact that three of the four “elements”
belonging to the Heideggerian “fourfold [das Geviert]” appear in the 
poem: the star above the well invokes the sky, and, as we have seen,
several words of the poem refer to the earth (the names of the ﬂ owers,
the well itself, the unleveled mounds, etc.). �e mortals could not 
be mentioned more directly: “der Mensch” (“... seit ein Gespräch wir 
sind ...,” p. 12). But the gods, the immortals, remain conspicuously ab-
sent. Nevertheless, the poem’s vocabulary – these words like ﬂ owers,
the well and the highland moor and the forest swards, and the possible
allusion, through the words Wasen and Orchis, to the root structure of 
plants (in German, Wurzelwerk) – also insinuates that perhaps some-
thing lies beneath the earth’s surface and beneath (or within) these 
earthen words, too; thus it seems that a certain conversion, an inversion
(if not perversion) of the fourfold structure has taken place:
Das Geviert hat sich also neu zusammengesetzt, die Unterirdisch-
en sind an die Stelle der Himmlischen getreten, das »Welt«-Bild 
Heideggers wird zum Kopfstand gezwungen: »Komm auf den Hän-
den ...« (Gellhaus, “»... seit ein Gespräch wir sind ...,” p. 12)
So the gaze (“Blick”) to the star above the well has turned upside 
down, heaven as an abyss opening under the poet’s feet.
In “Todtnauberg,” the trace of the disappeared (for Heidegger’s
Hölderlin, the trace of the escaped gods: “Spur der entﬂ ohenen Götter”)47
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has fallen from the skies, so to say, and materiali zed itself in the “tracks
or the humid thing [...] buried in the bog.”�e bog which has perhaps
replaced Hölderlin’s rivers and sources, origins.
“What is called poetry,” says Derrida in Shibboleth, “is perhaps 
only an intense familiarity with the ineluctable originarity of the spec-
ter.” Namely, an intense familiarity with the revenance which all words 
partake of, “from their ﬁrst emergence [La revenance est le partage 
de tous les mots, dès leur premier surgissement].”48 � e “luminescence”
caused by deterioration, looking at the “allegorical” dimension of the 
poem’s landscape, is maybe nothing, after all, but this spectral ﬁ gure 
of revenance.
Gi�, forgiveness, “hostipitality”
�e singular experience with language, “radical individuation,” a com-
mon theme to Heidegger and Celan,49 has to wrestle also with the 
legion of voices and their silence. A host of ambiguities resides in 
“Todtnauberg,” as we are beginning to see. And this counterpoint of 
a unique sentence (the poem consists of a single paratactic sentence) 
is marked by a single point of interrogation. Let us read a passage,
actually a compilation of sentences from the passage dealing with 
“Todtnau berg” in Derrida’s “To Forgive,” focused on this single ques-
tion mark and beginning with the words “as if ”:
as if there were no poetic experience, no experience of language as 
such without the experience of the gift and forgiveness – whether or 
not they are asked for, granted, given – the question mark around the 
name that comes before my own in the book [...], around the name of 
the other who will have preceded me and with whom I am, whether I 
want it or know it, [...] bound up in [...] the strange genealogy of this 
book: �is question mark indeed marks this anguish or this anxiety 
as to the name of the other, as to this other to whom I am given over 
with my eyes blindfolded, passively, although I sign, the other having 
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signed before me [...], the gift and forgiveness having taken place, or 
not, having taken place and having been nulliﬁed, carried away, with-
out my ever even having to make a decision. �is abyssal countersig-
nature forms one body with the poem, with the experience of lan-
guage itself, always as the language of the other, something that Celan 
knew and acknowledged so singularly, but which is also a universal 
experience of language. (“To Forgive,” p. 38)
All of the profound ambivalence or multivalence of “Todtnauberg” is 
not only circumstantial or thematic, historical or psychological, not 
only semantic or syntactic, nor even all these aspects taken together. It 
has to do with the universally singular experience of language, addres-
sed by Celan’s poetry and poetics.
Perhaps we might venture to say that speaking German, speaking 
any mother tongue, the language of the other, implies a gift granted 
or received, and an act of forgiveness. But this takes place, according 
to Derrida, beyond all conscious decision and power: “unconditional 
but without sovereignty” (“Le Siècle et le Pardon,” p. 133).
And perhaps we must aﬃrm, with Derrida, after all, that in the 
poem “Todtnauberg,” it is a question of an address of forgiveness, a 
scene of forgiveness. But forgiveness itself is aporetic through and 
through, “undecidably equivocal.” Like a poem, which does not just 
record an incident but speaks the language that is always the lan-
guage of another, of others, those before my signature and those after 
it. “Forgiveness perhaps implies,” writes Derrida, “from the outset, as 
if by hypothesis, the appearance on the scene of a third party whom 
it nonetheless must, should, exclude” (“To Forgive,” p. 34). A little like 
prayer: destined to a singular addressee, but also exposed to an apos-
trophe that multiplies the address. One of the axioms for forgiveness 
is the personal relation, face to face, heart to heart; but on the other 
hand, can true forgiveness ever exclude the third party? 
As Celan writes in a much earlier poem: “Welches der Worte du 
sprichst –/ du dankst/ dem Verderben.” “Whichever word you speak –/ 
you thank/ the deterioration” (GW1, 129; my trans.). Deterioration 
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or corruption – such as the one to which we owe our words, for bet-
ter or for worse – decay is a process in time: just as your name, any-
one’s name, in the guest book, is exposed to those that were recorded 
before yours, and also to those that shall be recorded after yours, the 
polysemy of such seemingly innocent words as Waldwasen and Knüp-
pelpfade is irreducible; not only because of their past, but also because 
of their future, the words to come in a future syntax; for instance that 
of an interpretation.
�e necessary risk of decay, but as an exposure which is also a
chance, as both Celan and Derrida have aﬃrmed, is not all that Derrida
must have meant, when he in passing and in parentheses speaks of “(a
theme to which [he] should return later – the theme of verbal language,
of discourse as the disastrous condition of forgiveness, which makes
possible forgiveness but which also destroys it).” But there are other, let
us say, linguistic problems with the performative speech act of beseech-
ing or granting forgiveness. For instance, “if I grant forgiveness on con-
dition that the other confess, that the other begin to redeem himself,
to transﬁgure his fault, to dissociate himself from it in order to ask me
for forgiveness, then my forgiveness begins to let itself be contaminat-
ed by an economy, a calculation that corrupts it” (“To Forgive,” p. 46).
And Derrida continues, by linking this granting of forgiveness to the
other speech act, namely to asking for forgiveness:
As soon as the word “pardon!” – the performative of forgiveness as 
speech act – is uttered, is there not the beginning of a reappropriation,
a mourning process, a process of redemption, of a transﬁ guring cal-
culation which, through language, the sharing of language [...] rushes 
toward the economy of a reconciliation that causes the wrong itself to 
be simply forgotten or annihilated, and thus this unforgivable as well,
this unforgivable that is the only possible correlate of a forgiveness 
worthy of the name, of an absolutely singular forgiveness as unique 
event, unique but necessarily iterable, as always? �e result of this law 
of iterable unicity, promised to repetition, divided by the promise that 
haunts all forgiveness, the result of this law of iterable unicity is that 
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at the same time there is no sense in asking for forgiveness collec-
tively of a community, a family, an ethnic or religious group – and at 
the same time multiplicity and the third and the witness are involved 
from the outset [d’entrée de jeu de la partie]. (“To Forgive,” p. 46)
A third party is always already involved, whether present or absent.
Whether present, as the man who drove the car and listened in, or 
absent, as those whose names were recorded “before mine” in the 
guest book, or those even more absent, who are neither named nor 
mentioned, but perhaps alluded to in an oblique manner, those whose 
trace we may only suspect in the unleveled forest swards and in their 
name Waldwasen, and even in the dampness of the bog.
Indeed, one should perhaps even ask for forgiveness for asking,
or for granting forgiveness. Earlier in the essay, Derrida points out 
that “one would even have to be forgiven forgiveness, which may itself 
also include the irreducible equivocation of an aﬃ  rmation of sove-
reig nty, indeed of mastery” (p. 22; cf. “Le Siècle et le Pardon,” p. 132).
Here we have an analogy between gift and forgiveness, since “[o]ne 
is always guilty, one must always be forgiven the gift.”50 Following up 
from what Derrida says here, I have to ask for forgiveness for ask-
ing for forgiveness, since by asking, by this speech act, I put the other 
in the position of having to decide whether to grant or to refuse for-
giveness, in the suspicious position of sovereignty with regard to the 
other who pronounces that speech act and forces me to pronounce 
mine, in response – even refusing to respond, even silence would sig-
nify a decision, here there seems to be no “neither-nor” – and on the 
other hand, I have to ask for forgiveness for granting forgiveness, for 
putting myself or letting myself be put in the position of making the 
quasi-sovereign decision concerning the other, the other’s past, pre-
sent and future.51
Derrida even argues that when I say “I do not forgive you” to 
someone who asks forgiveness, to someone whom I understand and 
who understands me, a process of reconciliation has already begun 
and the third has intervened; thus the pure, singular forgiveness is 
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already ruined (cf. “Le siècle et le pardon,” p. 123). �ere is no scene 
of forgiveness without the involvement of the third, and there is no 
scene of forgiveness without these complications and implications 
and tensions. Since there is the third, since the third is there – there 
from the outset – since, as Derrida says in a sentence that is not in-
cluded in the English version of the text “To Forgive,” “the face-to-
face is at the same time interrupted and made possible by the third”
(Pardonner, p. 89, my trans.), I must ask for forgiveness for asking for 
forgiveness as well as for granting forgiveness: “Je dois demander par-
don – pour être juste.” Derrida explains this equivocal sentence with 
the emphasized preposition pour as follows: “I must ask forgiveness 
in order to be just, to be just, with a view to being just; but I must 
also ask forgiveness for being just, for the fact of being just, because 
I am just, because in order to be just, I am unjust and I betray. I must 
ask forgiveness for (the fact of ) being just” (“To Forgive,” p. 49; Par-
donner, p. 89).
A scene of forgiveness, which must be singular and, as it seems,
bipolar (between two persons, between two hearts: the one who re-
quests and the other who grants), still takes place “between three,”
but – and thus – it takes place “always again only for once,” and never,
perhaps, once-and-for-all. � e ﬁgure of the third party, as a listen-
er-in or a signatory, anterior or posterior, may always multiply itself.
Forgiveness does not abolish the guilt or fault, it is not absolution and 
it cannot be clemency, either: it leaves room for the word and signa-
ture of the third party.
Following Axel Gellhaus, we agreed that gods are conspicuously 
absent from “Todtnauberg,” and discovered therein the inverted ver-
sion of the Heideggerian “fourfold [Geviert].” However, perhaps there 
is, in the poem, even an allusion to divinity.�e strophe, whose words 
should maybe gain a certain emphasis by their very laconic nature 
and graphic, “in der/ Hütte,” names another ﬁgure of hospitality be-
sides the Hüttenbuch, which has been abbreviated into “das Buch [...] 
dies Buch” in the poem. In Biblical language, Hütte also means a taber-
nacle – tabernacle of testimony (cf. DWB, Bd. 18, Sp. 2931). Celan 
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knew well Heidegger’s talk of language as the house of being (“Haus 
des Seins”) or as the temple of being, and also of poetry as a “shrine 
without a temple [tempelloser Schrein].” And the story of a philoso-
pher’s hospitality, told ﬁrst by Aristotle and repeated by Heidegger in 
his “Letter on ‘Humanism’,” namely the words Heraclitus spoke when 
visitors came to see the revered thinker and found him warming him-
self by the stove: “for here too, the gods are present.”52 So even though 
the word that was written in the Hüttenbuch, the word Hüttenbuch it-
self, has been eﬀaced or divided in the poem, there still resounds a 
counterpoint of sorts between “in the / hut” and “in the book.”
Where there is hospitality, or “hostipitality” as Derrida has coined,
and where there is forgiveness, there is God. And one does not have to
be a believer to believe this. God is the name of all names and the host
of all hosts, guest of all guests, the Wholly Other of every other, of all
the others, wholly others; and the “great �ird” too, of course.� e wit-
ness of all witnesses.�us, “it is [neither] by chance, nor contingent, nor
avoidable, that it would be always and ﬁ nally God that we ask of for-
giveness, even when we are linked by a scene of forgiveness, to one or
the other on earth” (“Hostipitality,” p. 397). In other words,
the third and the witness are involved from the outset [d’entrée de jeu 
de la partie]. �is may be one of the reasons, certainly not the only
one, why forgiveness is often asked of God. Of God not because he 
alone would be capable of forgiveness, of a power-to-forgive other-
wise inaccessible to man, but because, in the absence of the singulari-
ty of a victim who is sometimes no longer there to receive the request 
or to grant forgiveness, or in the absence of the criminal or the sin-
ner, God is the only name, the name of the name of an absolute and 
namable singularity as such. Of the absolute substitute. Of the abso-
lute witness, the absolute superstes, the absolute surviving witness. But 
inversely, if the address of forgiveness (I say the address of forgive-
ness to designate both the act of asking for forgiveness, of address-
ing a request for forgiveness, and the place from which forgiveness,
once the request is received by the addressee of the request, is either 
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granted or not granted), if the address of forgiveness is always singu-
lar, singular as to the fault, the sin, the crime, the harm, and singular 
as to the perpetrator or his victim, nonetheless it calls forth not only
repetition but through or as this repetition, a disidentiﬁcation, a dis-
seminating multiplication, [...]. (“To Forgive,” p. 46)
�e presence of the third party, the conspicuous absence of the third 
ensures “that the debate between forgiveness and the unforgivable 
will never have an end,” to quote Vladimir Jankélévitch. “Fortunately,
nothing ever has the last word!” (Forgiveness, p. 162).
Still, should we not ask if we have already let the poem speak the 
last word? Have we given the last word to the poem yet?
“Fortunately, the last word is 
always the penultimate word...”53
�e poem, “Todtnauberg,” ends in silence, as if stiﬂed by the mois-
ture: “Feuchtes, / viel.” But this silence itself is equivocal.
Derrida asks, right after repeating a quote from “Todtnauberg”:
“Must one refuse the experience of forgiveness to whoever does not 
speak? Or, on the contrary, must one make silence the very element 
of forgiveness, if there is such a thing?” (“To Forgive,” p. 47). Der-
rida’s suggestion that silence might be the very element of forgive-
ness does not mean that we should reach some taciturn agreement,
a quiet mutual understanding in order that we arrive at forgiveness,
instead of inextricably complicating matters and ruining everything 
by speaking. To the contrary. Language, one that is common to the 
forgiver and the forgiven, to the pardoner and the pardonee, shared 
by them both so that they can understand the fault and the guilt and 
their roles upon this scene, and so on, is at the same time both pre-
supposed by forgiveness and excluded by it, taken that the only for-
giveness worthy of the name would not be already contaminated by
the process of reconciliation, the work of mourning, understanding 
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the guilty person and his motives, and so on (cf. “Le Siècle et le Par-
don,” pp. 122–123). Only what is unforgivable can be truly forgiven,
as Derrida insists:
We constantly struggle in the snares [dans les rets] of an aporia whose 
abstract and dry form, whose logical formality is as implacable as it is 
indisputable: �ere is only forgiveness, if there is such a thing, of the 
un-forgivable. �us forgiveness, if it is possible, if there is such a thing,
is not possible, it does not exist as possible, it only exists by exempt-
ing itself from the law of the possible, by impossibilizing itself, so to 
speak, and in the inﬁnite endurance of the im-possible as impossible;
and this is what it would have in common with the gift; [...]. (“To
Forgive,” p. 48; Pardonner, p. 84; cf. “To Forgive,” p. 30; see also e.g.
“Le Siècle et le Pardon,” p. 108, and “Hostipitality,” pp. 385ﬀ )
We must understand that Derrida’s remarks on “Todtnauberg” are not 
an interpretation of the poem, explication de texte in any accustomed 
sense, let alone that he would like to reach beyond the text, to tran-
scend it and tell us what he thinks Celan must have felt or thought or 
meant, in writing the poem or in meeting Heidegger and signing the 
guest book, and so on. Rather, let us quote his own words –
I myself will not venture to conﬁrm or invalidate [à conﬁ rmer ou à in-
ﬁrmer cette interprétation], I will not, out of respect for the letter and the
ellipsis of Celan’s poem, rush into an interpretation so transpa rent and
univocal; I abstain from this not only out of hermeneutic prudence or
out of respect for the letter of the poem, but also because I would like to
suggest that forgiveness (granted or asked for), the address of forgive-
ness, must forever remain, if there is such a thing, undecidably equivo-
cal, by which I do not mean ambiguous, shady, twilit, but heterogeneous
to any determination in the order of knowledge, of determinate theo-
retical judgment, of the self-presentation of an appro priable sense [de
la présentation de soi d’un sens appropriable] (it is an aporetic logic that,
at least from this point of view, forgiveness would have [in common]
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with the gift, but I will leave this analogy in progress or undeveloped
here). (“To Forgive,” p. 36; Pardonner, p. 49)
Do we have the right to forgive? Do we have the right to deny for-
giveness? Do we have the right to decide upon the nature of the 
“mutually exchanged silence” between the two men, “Orchis und Or-
chis, einzeln”? Does the word Feuchtes not address an eye, too? � e 
word seems to reﬂect several previous words and clauses in the poem,
including “Augentrost, der / Trunk aus dem Brunnen,” “kommendes / 
Wort,” “Krudes.” Clearly it cannot be read only as an apposition to the 
strophe that precedes it,
die halb-
beschrittenen Knüppel-
pfade im Hochmoor,
since by virtue of its grammatical form (nominalized present parti-
ciple), the last strophe, “Feuchtes,/ viel,” rather just adds to the paratac-
tic inventory of which the whole poem virtually consists.� is “damp-
ness,/ much” may designate the weather conditions and the highland 
moor but may designate a host of other things, too. �e eyes, for 
instance, as in “Engführung,” another poem speaking of a word and of 
humidity, a word that came and “would glisten” or “wanted to shine,”
and a moist eye. �is is an excerpt from the ﬁfth “movement” of that 
1958 “Stretto”:
Kam, kam.
Kam ein Wort, kam,
kam durch die Nacht,
wollt leuchten, wollt leuchten.
Asche.
Asche, Asche.
Nacht.
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Nacht-und-Nacht. – Zum
Aug geh, zum feuchten.54
Obviously enough, the words written in the visitors’ book at Todtnau-
berg were written in the hope that they would reach a human eye and
heart.
In one of his notes written while preparing the Meridian speech,
Celan discusses “judaization” or “jewiﬁcation” and “conversion,” refer-
ring also more or less explicitly to Heidegger:
Verjuden: Es ist das Anderswerden, Zum-anderen-und-dessen-Ge-
heimnis-stehn – / – Liebe zum Menschen ist etwas anderes als Phi-
lanthropie – / Umkehr – dazu scheint es ja nun doch zuviel Einbahn-
straßen zu geben. – Gegenverkehr und Umkehr, das ist zweierlei aber 
auch auf den Feldwegen scheint es, ach, wenig Gelegenheit dazu zu 
geben. (TCA/Meridian, Ms. 417. Cf. Ms. 690, Ts. 847, Ts. 858)
�e point of the words “auf den Feldwegen” is clear and sharp. � e 
earliest reading traces in Heidegger’s works contained in Celan’s per-
sonal library are the underlining of the dialectal word “Kuinzige” and 
the date “17.X.51” in the tiny booklet Der Feldweg (1949), and this 
is clearly Celan’s point of reference.55 �ose few pages would merit a 
very close reading, in extenso, but we shall not engage in that now.
� e “alas! [ach]” in Celan’s fragment – is it not, ﬁrst of all, an 
ironic, or even sarcastic interjection (far from “das »Kuinzige«,” a Swa-
bian sort of serene irony or compassionate melancholy evoked by
Heidegger), attesting to a disappointment or indignation in the face 
of the other’s “serene” silence? But secondly, and at the same time,
could it not be also an intimation of sincere hope for the impossible,
and an acknowledgement of this impossibility, even if ironic at the 
same time? Not only sarcasm over an unwillingness or inability to 
turn back, but also a sincere regret over this inability or even impossi-
bility? When Celan writes that there seems to be hardly any oppor-
tunity for conversion upon the ﬁeld paths [“auch auf den Feldwegen 
EoE_book.indb   152 9.2.2010   20:47:37
153
scheint es, ach, wenig Gelegenheit dazu zu geben”], he seems to acknowl-
edge the more or less aporetic nature of Heidegger’s situation.
Axel Gellhaus points to the fact that when Heidegger was asked 
by Herbert Marcuse to distance himself publicly from National So-
cialism, he replied, in a letter dated January 20, 1948 (even here we
have a Twentieth of January!) that he would not be associated with 
those former partisans with whom he had nothing in common to be-
gin with, and who now, after the defeat, were making haste to mani-
fest their conversion “in a most obnoxious way [in der widerlichsten 
Weise ihren Gesinnungswandel bekundeten].”56 As regards the speciﬁ c 
sentence just quoted, and when read in its context, the meaning ap-
pears as quite unambiguous. Heidegger would not have anything to 
do with the backsliders, he would not show remorse by their side, in-
sofar as they had, until then, been eager supporters of the regime, who 
now had to make a complete about-face to escape with their skins,
and since he had not even previously had anything to do with them.
He would not be seen prostrate among the apostate. It takes either 
bad faith or bad reading, or a bit of both, to take Heidegger’s words to 
show that he never actually showed remorse because he never actually
abandoned his belief in the “Movement” and its Führer. If that would 
have been the case after all, namely if he actually remained loyal to 
Hitler not only after 1934 but even after 1945, his reply to Marcuse 
would show marvellous subtlety. Heidegger the Fox, indeed.
But in any case, we do not know. We do not know exactly what 
the “dampness” in question is, or was, and what exactly is the “much-
ness” of this “dampness,” after all. We do not know all that there is to 
it. And we shall never know.
Perhaps there was a tear. Perhaps. We shall never know. We
know, a priori as it were, that we shall never strictly speaking know 
what was, or might have been, behind the unknown, possible teardrop.
An old man’s lachrymosity? Das »Kuinzige« – serene melancholy? A 
fox’s – a crocodile’s – tear? Or a manifestation of a heart perhaps,
an unspoken word, a visible sign? Or nothing of the kind? We shall 
never know. What we do know is that after “dampness [Feuchtes]”
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comes “much [viel]” – much or many, who knows, and who knows 
what dampness.
�e speculation about the word Feuchtes is and must be imme-
diately and forever haunted by the multiplication involved in the last 
word, viel, “much” or “many.” We can never reduce the poem’s secret 
to a privacy and face-to-face intimacy that would not be, at the same 
time, exposed to divulgence, to “this repetition, a disidentiﬁ cation, a 
disseminating multiplication.” But, on the other hand, instead of “rep-
resenting” or “reproducing” something that could be “reported” in an 
anecdote, the two last words and lines of the poem manifest a secret 
that not only remains unattainable for us readers but also divides the 
(possible) intimacy of a conversation between the two (say, Celan and 
Heidegger) and witnessed by a third party (“he who drives us, the 
man, / who listens in”).�e two words, two lines, Feuchtes, / viel (may) 
manifest the (possible) silent humidity in the eyes of an old man. In 
all the ambiguity, in all the equivocality of the “many” or “much.” And 
this is to say: exactly what they (the words and the tears that remain 
in the realm of the possible) manifest remains forever beyond know-
ledge. �e manifestation both violently breaks into the open (or “veri-
ﬁes,” which has been used as an idiosyncratic but suggestive transla-
tion of Celan’s use of the verb wahrnehmen) the whole ambiguity and 
ambivalence but also, in so doing, preserves the secret as a secret.
Whether there really was a teardrop or not is not important 
here. Perhaps not. Insofar as the teardrop in the other’s eye leaves 
the atmosphere of the “as if ” or “perhaps” (which it never completely 
does, inasmuch as we simply cannot get inside the heart of the other 
and feel what he feels, think what he thinks, see what he sees, not to 
mention the caesura not only between us but also within us: a “symp-
tom” always remains, as if by deﬁnition, something exterior), insofar 
as it abandons the realms of dreams or images or unconsciousness,
that are not yet even the realms of ﬁction as we know it, and becomes 
a more or less veriﬁ able piece of reality (presuming that a moist eye,
or even a teardrop, might have been witnessed by someone; it would 
be quite ridiculous to speculate upon such a possibility) or an object 
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of positive speculation (thetic, thematic pretensions at transcending 
the “mirror of the soul” toward its referent), it may also become sus-
pect: perhaps a symptom of repentance or feigned repentance, inde-
cent sentimentality, self-therapy for the conscience, making amends,
work of mourning, transﬁguration, reconciliation, all these econo-
mies of redemption, mentioned by Derrida, that would contaminate 
and corrupt true forgiveness, “if there is one.” So, with all the condi-
tions of possibility and impossibility of true forgiveness taken into ac-
count, perhaps the possible (imagined) dew-drop must retain its si-
lence, its momentariness, its atmospheric suspension, its undecidable 
equivocality.57
By “atmospheric suspension” I would like to allude, not only to 
the “air” of ﬁction or imagination, let alone “castles in the air” (“in der 
Luft”) and all the aerial or ethereal utopias, but also to one of the po-
ems in the Stimmen cycle that opens the book Sprachgitter, and the 
words “blieb hängen” and “Atme” in it:
Jakobsstimme:
Die Tränen.
Die Tränen im Bruderaug.
Eine blieb hängen, wuchs.
Wir wohnen darin.
Atme, daß
sie sich löse.57
�ere is a Hasidic tale told by Martin Buber, quoting Rabbi Schmelke 
of Nikolsburg, on the tears of Esau:
In the Midrash it is written: “Messiah, son of David, will not come 
until the tears of Esau have ceased to ﬂ ow [die Erlösung komme nicht,
ehe die Tränen Esaus Versiegt sind].” �e children of Israel, who are 
God’s children, pray for mercy [Erbarmen] day and night; and shall 
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they weep in vain so long as the children of Esau shed tears? But the 
“tears of Esau” – that does not mean the tears which the peoples of 
the earth weep and you do not weep; they are the tears that all hu-
man beings weep when they ask something for themselves, and pray 
for it. And truly: Messiah, son of David, will not come until such 
tears ceased to ﬂow, until you weep because the Divine Presence is 
exiled [weil die Schechina verbannt ist], and because you yearn for its 
return.58
Aspiration is a word that translates as both hope (Hoﬀ nung) and 
breath (Wort).To say “breathe” (“Atme”), in the imperative or optative 
mode, is it not to express one’s hope for the other’s word, one’s hope 
for another’s hope, a shared hope in a shared abode (“Wir wohnen 
darin”), even in a divided atmosphere (“the air we have to breath” of 
which Celan speaks in � e Meridian)?59 Such an expression (or exha-
lation) of one’s hope for another’s word, a word for another’s hope, is 
far from being similar to praying for mercy, clemency or compassion 
just for oneself and one’s own, pro domo. I believe such an aspiration,
a word that just “would glisten, would glisten,” desires to exceed all 
the economies of give-and-take, including the economies of forgive-
ness. By ﬁ xing the “date”60 of an eye-to-eye, heart-to-heart encounter,
or by indicating the singularity of circumstances (even through the 
minimal indication involved in using the second person singular), by
signing the visitors’ book, so to speak, a poem also exceeds its own in-
timate conditions of possibility – and impossibility – or if you will, the 
“sense-certainty” of the “here and now,” by becoming readable.
Notes
1 Two recent books having almost identical titles must be mentioned ﬁ rst of 
all, dealing with both the face-to-face encounter at Todtnauberg and the intel-
lectual, textual exchange over the years: Hadrien France-Lanord, Paul Celan et 
Martin Heidegger : le sens d’un dialogue (Paris: Fayard, 2004), and James K. Lyon,
Paul Celan and Martin Heidegger: An Unresolved Conversation, 1951–1970 (Bal-
timore: Johns Hopkins U.P., 2006). Both make good use of recent publications 
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and also archive material. Both are also relatively impartial, even though Lyon 
caricatures Heidegger right away quite roughly as “an arch-German nationalist”
(p. 1); on the other hand, France-Lanord has been criticized for not being always
able to resist an apologetic tone in favor of his maître à penser, for being “dispiri-
tingly one-sided, exclusively pro-Heideggerian” (cf. e.g. Leslie Hill, “‘Distrust of 
Poetry’: Levinas, Blanchot, Celan,” in MLN 120 [2005], pp. 986–1008, here p.
1003n9). I do not agree with this critique, nor with Lyon’s labeling of France-
Lanord’s book as (too) “[p]hilosophical, speculative” (p. viii). Being “philosoph-
ical” is necessary in dealing with Heidegger’s and Celan’s phenomenologies of 
poetry, and one can be “speculative” in more than one way – France-Lanord’s 
way is by far not the worst kind of speculation. France-Lanord does aﬃ  rm the 
“extreme tension” of the relationship on Celan’s part and never lapses into mere 
apologetics, let alone into a biased polemic in the style of Jean Bollack (cf. be-
low). France-Lanord has not avoided discussing, in the mentioned book or in 
other contexts, even those documents that are rather painful to acknowledge for 
anyone profoundly impressed by Heidegger’s work (such as Paul Celan himself 
obviously was). He dismisses not only the militantly anti-Heideggerean pole-
mics, but also those interpretations that tend to neutralize the tension and am-
bivalence in a more positive fashion: for instance Hans-Georg Gadamer’s “in-
decent image” of Celan as “one of the many pilgrims” who wanderered to the 
thinker’s abode, which is indeed obscene, not only toward the poet but also to-
ward the thinker. Gadamer ended his few pages of homage to Heidegger, con-
tained in the book Philosophische Lehrjahre, by citing the poem “Todtnauberg”
and indeed calling Celan one of the “Wallfahrern nach Todtnauberg” ([Frankfurt 
a. M.: Klostermann, 1977], p. 220; cf. France-Lanord, p. 95). But I think the 
many polemical interpretations of this poem and of this encounter are just as 
obscene, such as Jean Bollack’s view of Celan as a poetic sorcerer, laying some 
sort of strategic trap for his host, “pre-programming” a “drama” to be played out 
in the middle of the “germanic fog” in the highland moor, documented in the 
“serious game of poetic riddling,” as Bollack sees the poem “Todtnauberg” (“Vor 
dem Gericht der Toten: Paul Celans Begegnung mit Martin Heidegger und 
ihre Bedeutung,” trans. Werner Wägenbauer, in Neue Rundschau vol. 109 no. 1 
[1998], pp. 127–156, here, pp. 140, 142, 144, passim; original French text: “Le 
Mont de la mort : le sens d’une rencontre entre Celan et Heidegger,” in Lignes
29 [1996], pp. 159–188). For Otto Pöggeler’s response to Bollack’s polemic di-
rected, among others, at Pöggeler, cf. the latter’s Der Stein hinterm Aug: Studien 
zu Celans Gedichten (München: Fink, 2000), pp. 159–188 [i.e. chapter “Celans 
Begegnung mit Heidegger”], here pp. 186ﬀ. While Pöggeler takes an anti-po-
lemic attitude with regard to Bollack, his own polemics against Derrida’s read-
ings in Schibboleth – pour Paul Celan (Paris: Galilée, 1986) seem rather odd (cf.
Der Stein hinterm Aug, pp. 165ﬀ.). Bollack’s account of his conversations with 
his friend Celan are of course to be taken as seriously as any other, and as one 
of the many sources for information concerning the incident, but it is also ob-
vious, even in terms of Bollack’s own view of the poem as the primary mani-
festation of the alleged scheme being succesfully realized, that even these pri-
vate exchanges call for exegetic intervention. Here are some of the other most 
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important and most recommendable texts related to the meeting and the poem 
itself, in more or less chronological order: Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, La poésie 
comme expérience (Paris: Bourgois, 1986); Gerhart Baumann, Erinnerungen an 
Paul Celan (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1992 [1st ed. 1986]); Otto Pöggeler,
Spur des Worts. Zur Lyrik Paul Celans (München: Alber, 1986), pp. 259–271; Pög-
geler, “Heidegger  und Celan in der französischen Diskussion,” in Eliane Escou-
bas & Bernhard Waldenfels, eds., Phénoménologie française et phénoménologie al-
lemande / Deutsche und Französische Phänomenologie (France: Harmattan, 2000),
pp. 609–632; Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Im Schatten des Nihilismus,” in Hu-
bert Dethier, Eldert Willens, eds., Cultural Hermeneutics of Modern Art. Essays 
in Honor of Jan Aler (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1989), pp. 233-244, esp. pp. 242ﬀ .;
Gadamer & Silvio Vietta, Im Gespräch (München: Fink, 2002); Paul Celan,
Gisèle Celan- Lestrange, Corres pondance (1951–1970): Avec un choix de lettres de 
Paul Celan à son ﬁls Eric. Éditée et commentée par Bertrand Badiou avec le concours 
d’Eric Celan, 2 vols. (Paris: Seuil, 2001), passim, esp. nos. 533, 534, 536; Axel 
Gellhaus, “»... seit ein Gespräch wir sind ...«. Paul Celan bei Martin Heidegger 
in Todtnauberg,” in Spuren 60, Jan. 2004, zweite Auﬂage (Marbach am Neck-
ar: Deutsche Schillergesellschaft, cop. 2002) [15 pp.]. Among the several liter-
ary works directly or indirectly referring to the poem and the encounter are, e.g.,
Jorge Semprún, L’écriture ou la vie (Paris: Gallimard, 1994); Elfriede Jelinek, To-
tenauberg. Ein Stück (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1991); Günter Grass, Mein Jahrhun-
dert (Göttingen: Steidl, 1999), pp. 238–252 (years 1966–1968). For several other 
texts related to the encounter, cf. e.g. Michael Mayer, “Hoﬀnung auf das Wort,”
in Berliner Zeitung (März 7, 1998), p. 12; Sieghild Bogumil, “Todtnauberg,” in 
Hans-Michael Speier, ed., Celan-Jahrbuch 2 (Heidelberg: Winter, 1988), pp. 37–
52; Stephan Krass, “‘Mit einer Hoﬀnung auf ein kommendes Wort’: Die Be-
gegnung von Paul Celan und Martin Heidegger,” in Neue Zürcher Zeitung (2.–
3. Aug. 1997), pp. 57–58.  In 2002 there was a special dossier thématique under 
the heading “Document” in the French literary review Magazine littéraire ( Jan-
vier 2002), with two articles, the ﬁrst entitled “Celan/Heidegger : Lumières sur 
une rencontre,” and the second, “La responsabilité d’une pensée”; these were
written by Frédéric de Towarnicki and Hadrien France-Lanord, respectively.
An earlier, furiously polemical article directed against  a certain “Heideggeri-
anism” of some “French” readers of Celan (especially Lacoue-Labarthe, but also 
Derrida and Blanchot) has been presented by Mark M. Anderson, “� e ‘Im-
possibility of Poetry’: Celan and Heidegger in France” (in New German Cri-
tique, no. 53 [Spring/Summer 1991], pp. 3–18). Anderson’s reading of Lacoue-
Labarthe’s La poésie comme expérience is quite selective and tendentious, and his 
speculations, for instance, about “deconstruction” as a “bizarre form of revision-
ism” (p. 15) are themselves precisely bizarre and uninformed. Anderson’s arti-
cle happens to precede Richard Wolin’s “Introduction to Herbert Marcuse and 
Martin Heidegger: An Exchange of Letters” (pp. 19–27), in the same issue, and 
Wolin’s translation of these 1947–1948 letters (pp. 28–32), containing an out-
rageously misconstrued phrase that completely distorts Heidegger’s words; we
shall return to this piece of disinformation in another note.
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2. Otto Pöggeler has told how Celan once said to him: “Heidegger war mein Ge-
genüber” (reported by James K. Lyon upon his personal interview with Pöggel-
er, in Paul Celan and Martin Heidegger, p. 22). By using the past tense, Celan 
refers to the years when he was most intensely and extensively engaged with 
Heidegger’s works, namely in the early ﬁfties: during the years 1952–1954 
Celan read for the ﬁrst time such books as Sein und Zeit, Holzwege, Einführung 
in die Metaphysik, Was heißt Denken and some others; he made many underlin-
ings, marginal remarks and notes and also dated his readings (cf. Lyon, loc. cit. 
& p. 219; Celan, La bibliothèque philosophique / Die philosophische Bibliothek, ed.
Alexandra Richter et al. [Paris: Rue d’Ulm, 2004], pp. 338–418). Heidegger 
had been his vis-à-vis, his interlocutor for at least ﬁfteen years before they met 
face to face, or at least had been for some time. �is reader’s engagement con-
tinued, albeit perhaps less vis-à-vis, until the poet’s death in 1970. Gegenüber
is actually the word used in the title of the German translation of Ossip Man-
delstam’s essay “On the Interlocutor,” and an important term in the vocabulary 
of the Meridian speech: “Das Gedicht will zu einem Andern, es braucht dieses An-
dere, es braucht ein Gegenüber” (Der Meridian. Endfassung, Entwürfe, Materialien, 
in Werke: Tübinger Ausgabe, 9 vols, ed. Jürgen Wertheimer et al. [Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 1996-2004], 9 = “Endfassung,” section 35a.� is nine-volume 
Tübingen edition is henceforth cited as TCA, followed by the title of the vol-
ume; e.g., in this case, TCA/Meridian, Endf. 35a. Sometimes I also refer to Ge-
sammelte Werke in sieben Bänden, ed. Beda Allemann [Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp,
2000], 7 vols, henceforth cited as GW, followed by the volume and page num-
bers). In Felstiner’s translation: “�e poem wants to reach an Other, it needs this 
Other, it needs an Over-against” (Selected Poems and Prose of Paul Celan, trans.
John Felstiner [New York: Norton, 2001], p. 409). On Celan’s ambivalence to-
ward Heidegger, see, besides Pöggeler’s various accounts, esp. France-Lanord’s 
and Lyon’s books. On Heidegger’s indications of a very diﬀerent  ambivalence 
toward Celan, see for example the following: “Heidegger’s admiration of Celan 
was also ambivalent, though in a diﬀerent way. Although he admired and felt 
drawn to Celan’s poetry, some of it he did not understand or ﬁ nd accessible,
which is why he enlisted Pöggeler, with his direct access[?] to Celan, as ‘transla-
tor’ and interpreter” (Lyon, p. 156). And the following: “Pöggeler claims that by
1964 Heidegger confessed that he found Celan’s poems in the volume entitled 
�e No One’s Rose, which appeared in 1963, unsympathetic, not easily accessible,
and too ‘allegorical’” (p. 157; cf. also p. 211). Cf. Pöggeler, Der Stein hinterm Aug, 
pp. 161–162; Spur des Worts, p. 249.
3 �e poetry reading in Freiburg was actually not his primary reason for traveling 
from Paris to Germany, but a sort of intermediate stop on his way to Frank-
furt, to settle some editorial matters with his publishers (cf. Paul Celan/ Gisèle 
Celan- Lestrange, Correspondance, ed. Bertrand Badiou [Paris: Seuil, 2001], vol.
1, p. 547ﬀ., i.e. no. 533).
4 Cf. e.g. Lyon, Paul Celan and Martin Heidegger, pp. 65–66, passim.
5 Cf. Lyon, Paul Celan and Martin Heidegger, p. 167 (paraphrasing Pöggeler,
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“‘Praktische Philosophie’ als Antwort an Heidegger,” p. 67 [Lyon, p. 231n24]);
Jankélévitch, paraphrasing Robert Minder (“Heidegger is responsible not only
for everything he said under Nazism but also for everything he abstained from 
saying in 1945”), is cited by Derrida, “To Forgive,” pp. 36, 50n11.
6 Cf. Pöggeler, Der Stein hinterm Aug, p. 164. Pöggeler was also “astonished at 
the poet’s spirited defense of Heidegger’s later works”; Celan “would not tole-
rate any criticism from him of the language in these later works” (Pöggeler is 
thus paraphrased by Lyon, p. 97).
7 TCA/Lichtzwang, p. 51.Trans. John Felstiner, in Selected Poems and Prose of Paul
Celan (New York: Norton, 2001): “TODTNAUBERG// Arnica, Eyebright, the/
drink from the well with the/ star-die on top,// in the/ hut,// into the book/ –
whose name did it take in/ before mine –?/ the line written into/ this book  about/
a hope, today,/ for a thinker’s/ (un-/delayed coming)/ word/ in the heart,// wood-
land turf, unleveled,/ Orchis and Orchis, singly,// crudeness, later, while driving,/
clearly,// the one driving us, the man/ who hears it too,// the half-/trodden log-/
paths on the high  moorland,// dampness,/ much.”Trans. Michael Hamburger, in
Poems of Paul Celan (New York: Persea Books, 2002): “TODTNAUBERG// Ar-
nica, eyebright, the/ draft from the well with the/ star-crowned die above it,// in
the/ hut,// the line/ – whose name did the book/ register before mine? –,/the line
inscribed/ in that book about/ a hope, today,/ of a thinking man’s/ coming/ word/
in the heart,// woodland sward, unlevelled,/ orchid and orchid, single,// coarse
stuﬀ, later, clear/ in passing,// he who drives us, the man,/ who listens in,// the
half-/trodden fascine/ walks over the high moors,// dampness,/ much.”
8 “To Forgive: �e Unforgivable and the Imprescriptible,” trans. Elizabeth Rot-
tenberg, in John Caputo, Mark Dooley, and Michael J. Scanlon, eds., Question-
ing God (Bloomington: Indiana U.P., 2001), pp. 21–51, here p. 36. Derrida’s text 
was ﬁrst presented in a 1997 conference and appeared ﬁrst in English, and just 
a day before his death in the original French in the special issue of Cahiers de 
l ’Herne. �is French version was reprinted in the series “Carnets de l’Herne” as 
Pardonner – l ’impardonnable et l ’imprescriptible (Paris: L’Herne, 2005); the ex-
pression “indécidablement équivoque” appears on p. 50. In the volume Questioning 
God, Derrida’s “To Forgive” is followed by a transcript of a roundtable discus-
sion “On Forgiveness” (“On Forgiveness: A Roundtable Discussion with Jacques 
Derrida. Moderated by Richard Kearney,” pp. 52–72), which is another very im-
portant text with regard to Derrida’s work on forgiveness.
9 Cf. also Donner la mort (Paris: Galilée, 1999), pp. 185, 192. On literature as 
the topos of utopian (or a-topic, if you will) gift and forgiveness, cf. Derrida,
Donner le temps 1: La fausse monnaie (Paris: Galilée, 1991), and Donner la mort
(Paris: Galilée, 1999); in the latter, see especially the discussions of Kierke-
gaard’s imaginary versions of the story of Abraham and Isaac and Kafka’s Brief
and den Vater.
10 Cf. La poésie comme expérience,  pp. 57–58; En. trans. Poetry as Experience, trans.
Andrea Tarnowski (Stanford: Stanford U.P., 1999), p. 38.
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11 Cit. France-Lanord, Paul Celan et Martin Heidegger, p. 119. Heidegger would 
be there to attend the reading among the 1200 listeners who were “holding 
their breath for an hour,” who applauded at length and then still listened to the 
poet for another ﬁfteen minutes, as Celan proudly told his wife in a letter (Cor-
respondance, No. 536). On July 24, 1967, as he came to Freiburg, Celan was re-
portedly very aﬀected to see in every bookstore window his collections of poet-
ry, and nobody told him that it was actually Heidegger who had beseeched the 
book dealers to showcase his books. An hour before the very successful read-
ing, the two met for the ﬁrst time personally, in a hotel lobby, and were engaged 
in an informal conversation; but when someone was planning to record their 
encounter, Celan suddenly rose from his seat and by this gesture refused to be 
photographed together with the former Rector of the University. Heid egger 
was reportedly neither surprised nor oﬀended by this. A moment later Cel-
an came back and said that the photo could now be taken, and everyone acted 
as if nothing had happened; the picture was not taken, after all. After the very
succesful reading, Heidegger invited the poet to visit him the next day in Tod-
tnauberg and Celan accepted the invitation (cf. e.g. Lyon, Paul Celan and Mar-
tin Heidegger, pp. 160ﬀ ).
12 Letter of Aug. 2nd, 1967 to Gisèle Celan-Lestrange, in Correspondance (no.
536); trans. Lyon, modiﬁed (p. 167).
13 �e English translation by Andrea Tarnowski contains an error: “He should 
have been the ﬁrst to say something. And I was wrong to think initially that 
it was enough to ask forgiveness. It is absolutely unforgivable. �at is what he 
should have said [sic]” (Poetry as Experience, p. 122).�e error lies in translating 
the impersonal il by the personal pronoun “he,” disregarding the diﬀ erence be-
t ween devoir (“il aurait dû dire”) and falloir (“il fallait dire”): “�at is what he 
should have said” is not correct.�e French sentence should be translated more 
or less as follows: “�at is what should have been said.” Or even: “�at is what 
I should have said.” How could Heidegger have said, after the War, that his si-
lence after the War was unforgivable? � e construct “il fallait dire” is imperson-
al and refers to what should have been said earlier in the book La poésie comme 
expérience, that is, what Lacoue-Labarthe thinks he himself should have said,
namely that Heidegger’s silence after the war was unforgivable, instead of his 
initial suggestion concerning “the word pardon.” �e erroneous translation con-
fuses the point, I’m afraid. In the text, Lacoue-Labarthe stated just before the 
sentences in question that “Heidegger’s irreparable oﬀense” was not “his dec-
larations of 1933–34, which we can understand without approving, but his si-
lence on the extermination” (Poetry as Experience, p. 122). It is this silence that 
Lacoue-Labarthe deems unforgivable. In any case, the whole issue is desperate-
ly complicated, as we are perhaps beginning to see. And not only with regard 
to Heidegger’s situation in the �ird Reich (1933–1945), as an “internal” crit-
ic of Nazism, and as someone whose every move must have been surveyed, as it 
seems; the letter to Marcuse of January 20, 1948 (GA 16, 430–431), mentioned 
below, points out some of these diﬃculties related not only to the possibility of 
heroic resistance within the totalitarian state but also to the possibility of mani-
festing remorse after the �ird Reich had collapsed.
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14 “C’est en face de ce mot [le mot pardon] que Celan nous a situés. Un signe ?”
15 Cf. Derrida, “To Forgive,” p. 38.�e word “extravagant” comes from an article 
by Chris Kaposy who, more or less in the old Carnapian manner, “seeks to apply 
some of the tools of analytic philosophy to a text written by a ‘continental’ phi-
losopher, in order to evaluate the quality of its arguments” (“‘Analytic’ Reading,
‘Continental’ Text: �e Case of Derrida’s ‘On Forgiveness’,” International Journal 
of Philosophical Studies Vol. 13(2), 203–226, here p. 223). One of the main points 
in Kaposy’s text is that “the pragmatics of a concept and the ethical arguments 
about how a concept should be used are two diﬀerent issues that, for clarity’s 
sake, should be considered separately” (p. 223). For the sake of brevity, I would 
only ask one question: When we are speaking of the concept of forgiveness, how 
long can we keep description and prescription rigorously apart?
16 “Tout poème est de circonstance” (Michel Deguy, “Paul Celan, 1990,” in La 
raison poétique [Paris: Galilée, 2000], pp. 85–98, here p. 93). See also Lacoue-
Labarthe, La poésie comme expérience, p. 83: “la poésie est poésie de circonstance.”
See also Derrida’s contribution to a discussion in a colloquy on Peter Szondi’s
work, in 1979: “�ere is always an address in each poem, a poem is dedicated 
in one way or another. And this address is at one and the same time secret, it is 
always secret in every way, and its secret oﬀers something to read, it turns away 
from itself, that’s what language is” (translation by James G. Hughes slightly 
modiﬁ ed, in boundary 2, Vol. 11, No. 3, �e Criticism of Peter Szondi [Spring 
1983], pp. 155–167, here p. 157).
17 Pöggeler reports Heidegger’s inquiries about Celan’s parents’ death at an ex-
termination camp (cf. Pöggeler, Der Stein hinterm Aug, p. 162). He has also in-
sisted that the motivation for Heidegger’s intense occupation with Celan, which 
he personally attested to, having read Celan’s poetry together with Heidegger 
many times, had to do with the Holocaust (Der Stein hinterm Aug, p. 167; cf. also 
France-Lanord, Paul Celan et Martin Heidegger, p. 194).
18 Cf. Silvio Vietta, in Gadamer and Vietta, Im Gespräch, p. 82.
19 Cf. TCA/Lichtzwang, p. 48n, and Lyon, Paul Celan and Martin Heidegger, p.
168, as well as Celan’s correspondence with his wife Gisèle related to this mat-
ter.
20 Celan was reportedly very annoyed at Neumann’s later article, which com-
pared him with Mallarmé in terms of “absolute metaphor,” in spite of the fact 
that Celan had in the Meridian clearly distanced himself from Mallarmé, from 
metaphor, and from the idea of an “absolute poem” (cf. e.g. Pöggeler, Der Stein 
hinterm Aug, p. 175).
21 �is much we know partly from his correspondence with his wife Gisèle,
partly from Jean Bollack’s already-mentioned article, partly from other sources 
(e.g. Lyon, Paul Celan and Martin Heidegger, p. 164), and from an article in Neue 
Zürcher Zeitung by Stephan Krass, who appears to have interviewed Neumann 
and reports his rather hesitant account of the “long pauses” and Celan’s question 
whether Heidegger would speak publicly about his involvement with National 
EoE_book.indb   162 9.2.2010   20:47:37
163
Socialism (NZZ 2.–3. Aug. 1997, p. 57). Jean Bollack lists in his article several 
photocopied documents that Celan’s widow Gisèle entrusted to him in 1981,
apparently frustrated by those interpretations of the poem that had appeared 
until then; Bollack tells that he began his more intensive engagement with his 
late friend’s poetry at about that time. Among these documents were two let-
ters from Gerhard Neumann to Paul Celan, dated in October 1967 and January 
1968. Bollack’s description of the relationship between the young scholar and 
the poet is quite remarkable, and quite harsh: it is as if Celan had chosen this 
“human being” who happened to drive the car as the privileged witness of the 
“epochal conversation,” and as if the poor young Germanist was both very much 
taken by this honour and wanted very much to shy away from this responsibility 
(cf. Bollack, “Vor dem Gericht der Toten,” pp. 145–146).
22 Cit. e.g. Pöggeler, Der Stein hinterm Aug, p. 172. A facsimile of these lines in 
Heidegger’s guest book can be found in Axel Gellhaus, “»... seit ein Gespräch 
wir sind ...,” p. 5.
23 �e word was to come from the heart of the thinker, as the poem seems to 
say; actually the poem says this equivocally, because the syntax allows for more 
than two diﬀ erent readings. �e hope for the word is in the heart of the one 
who hopes for it, or the word to come is itself a word in the heart of the one 
who is to pronounce it, in the thinker’s heart and to come from his heart. But 
the advocate in “the tribunal of the dead,” Jean Bollack, who summons “a school 
of harshness” against all reconciliation and weakness, also wants to ward oﬀ  all 
Heideggerianism from the poem in which the poet speaks “in his own language,
with his own words,” and tells us that all those numerous interpretations that 
detach from the context the clause “coming/ word/ in the heart” or “word/ to 
come,/ in the heart,” instead of retaining the correct and natural syntactic rela-
tion, namely between “hope” and “heart,”  “a hope [...] in the heart,” are based 
on a false syntactical analysis (cf. Bollack, “Vor dem Gericht,” pp. 152–154). Ac-
cording to Bollack, the correct and natural syntax would not be “Wort im Herz-
en,” as the Heideggereans and other Catholics or former Catholics would have 
it, but “von einer Hoﬀnung [...] im Herzen.” Bollack reads his late friend’s mind 
so that the poet never actually hoped and expected a word to come from Hei-
d egger, let alone from his heart, or to the heart of the one who hopes for it, but 
knew already that it was a vain hope; especially since he shared the skepticism 
of his friend Bollack. �e poet could perfectly anticipate everything that hap-
pened and that did not happen, Bollack seems to claim, and was only staging a 
drama in order to write the whole plot down in a poem. But why should there 
be this equivocality, this syntactical possibility of reading the drama otherwise? 
If there is only one “natural” way of reading the sentence and of attributing the 
heart, why opt for poetry, such a notoriously ambivalent way of speaking? And 
why should the poet eﬀace all the Heideggerean traces in favour of his “own lan-
guage and own words” if the whole poem consists of an address to Heidegger,
however oblique it may be? And even more so, if the address is rather oblique-
ly directed at once also past Heidegger, around the primary addressee, ironical-
ly to the third party which we all are as the readers of this poem? In any case,
the mentioned word, word-to-come, is not known as such. �e poem does not 
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record the conversation as such, neither directly nor indirectly, but rather men-
tions the hope, the expectation, that must have been pronounced during the 
conversation. It does not, so to say, record the content but only the form of the 
expectation.
24 Forgiveness, trans. Andrew Kelly (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005),
p. 49; cf. p. 5: “True forgiveness, which is at the margins of all legality, is a gra-
cious gift from the oﬀended to the oﬀender. True forgiveness is a personal re-
lation with another person.” According to Jankélévitch, forgiveness should be 
“eﬃcacious” and “lasting,” while also “one that comes to pass in the sudden-
ness of the instant”; it should be an event involving “charity” and “the relation 
of one heart to another”; it must be a “gratuitous gift,” but in the last analysis,
not “an absolutely gratuitous gift, since it is necessary to have committed mis-
deeds in order to merit it,” and so on (pp. 34, 35, 49, 124). �e mentioned gra-
tuity is as unlikely to be confused with generosity as clemency is to be confused 
with forgiveness: “Clemency is forgiveness that has no interlocutor. [...] Clem-
ency is not forgiveness any more than generosity is love” (pp. 6, 7). In his own 
discussions on forgiveness, Derrida radicalizes Jankélévitch’s discourse on for-
giveness, for instance with respect to the aporias of the gift; such a gesture of 
deconstructive radicalization is, as I would like to say, a sort of generosity that 
does not exclude love.
25 Gerhard Baumann recalls that he met Celan and Heidegger the day after their 
encounter at Todtnauberg, and to his great surprise and joy he found them both 
in a very good mood, recollecting their day in the Black Forest. According to 
Baumann, Celan seemed as if relieved of a great weight, and many other wit-
nesses have testiﬁed that the meeting went very well and had a good eﬀ ect on 
Celan. Marie-Louise Kaschnitz wondered what had happened in Freiburg that 
had changed her friend so much for the better. It has been conjectured that 
Heidegger had at least mentioned to Celan the famous Spiegel interview that 
he had given the previous year on the condition that it would be published only
after his death; there he would have made the explicit statements concerning his 
political “error”; so this would have been the public part of the explication (Bau-
mann, Lyon, France-Lanord and Pöggeler all discuss these matters).
26 Cf. Gadamer, “In the Shadow of Nihilism,” p. 123; Pöggeler takes Krudes to 
be a designation of Heidegger’s language in his later works, cf. Spur des Worts, 
p. 267.
27 �e Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed. 1989, OED Online, Oxford University 
Press, 5 July 2007, <http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50082514>.
28 �ese words are from Emily Dickinson’s famous poem “Because I Could Not 
Stop For Death.”
29 Das Deutsche Wörterbuch von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm auf CD-ROM und im 
Internet (1854ﬀ /2003), [based on:] Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob Grimm und 
Wilhelm Grimm. 16 Bde. [in 32 Teilbänden]. Leipzig: S. Hirzel (1854-1960;
EoE_book.indb   164 9.2.2010   20:47:37
165
Quellenverzeichnis 1971),  Version 2.0 / Mai 2003, http://germazope.uni-trier.
de/Projects/DWB, Bd. 27, Sp. 2276ﬀ.; henceforth cited as DWB.
30 Lyon, Paul Celan and Martin Heidegger, p. 179; cf. Pöggeler, Spur des Worts, 
p. 266 (and not 267 as Lyon signals); Wasen is sometimes used as a synonym 
for Schindanger, as Pöggeler remarks, i.e. locus cadaverum publicus (DWB, 
Bd. 15, Sp. 187).
31 Many who have written on “Todtnauberg” have speculated upon the individual 
syllables of the title, the toponym itself, Todtn-au-berg, whose syllable -au- 
would not only mean die Au, meadow, but would in addition allude even to the 
interjection au as well as to Augen, namely the eyes of the dead, and Auschwitz. 
� e word Tod in the ﬁrst syllable reminds of “Todesfuge” and its famous phrase 
“der Tod is ein Meister aus Deutschland,” and the poem “Engführung” belongs to 
the same chain of allusions, without doubt. But this has more to do with the in-
escapable horizon of the encounter than with some sort of tribunal of the dead 
where Heidegger’s stands as the sole accused. Cf. e.g. Pierre Joris, “Translation 
at the Mountain of Death: Celan and Heidegger,” in Alfred Bodenheimer & 
Shimon Sandbank, eds., Poetik der Transformation: Paul Celan – Übersetzer und 
übersetzt (Conditio Judaica #28) (Tübingen: Niemeyer Verlag, 1999); online at 
<http://wings.buﬀ alo.edu/epc/authors/joris/todtnauberg.html>.
32 “A Poet’s Hope,” in Boston Review. A Political and Literary Forum, Novem-
ber/December 2005; online at <http://www.bostonreview.net/BR30.6/perloﬀ .
html>.
33 “TODTENAUGE, n.: die blassen gestalten, die ihre todtenaugen noch ein-
mal gegen uns aufheben. J. PAUL Hesp. 4, 75” (DWB, Bd. 21, Sp. 596).
34 Charles Bernstein reports to have found this information on a “‘Herbal In-
formation’ website” (“Celan’s folds and veils,” in Textual Practice 18(2), 2004,
pp. 199-205, here p. 200); but this is also mentioned in most other commen-
taries and interpretations of this poem; you can also see the entries “euphrasia,”
“euphrasy,” “eye-bright” in the OED. And esp. DWB: “AUGENTROST, m. eu-
phrasia, eine den augen wolthuende, heilsame wiesenblume, sonst auch augendienst 
genannt, nnl. oogentroost, schw. ögontröst, dän. öientröst, altn. augnafrô (augen-
ruhe), ags. eágvyrt, engl. eyebright, wie mhd. der klee ougenbrehende heiszt und 
die euphrasia mit noch andern namen die tageleuchte, die weisze leuchte, der lich-
te tag, vgl. ags. däges eáge (tages auge) primula veris, engl. zusammengezogen in
daisy. schottisch sagt man ee o’ day (auge des tags) schön für mittag ( JAMIESON 
1, 350 und suppl. 1, 361). trœsten aber wurde mhd. mehr gebraucht für wolthun 
in den augen :// [...] den gegensatz bildet der dorn im auge (s. Auge 7)” (Bd 1, Sp.
813). Let us follow the cross reference to “Auge”: “7)  in den augen, in die augen.
eine thräne im auge; thränen standen ihr im auge. GÖTHE 20, 34; [...] der stern 
im auge; der balken im auge; ormr î auga, wurm im auge, altn. beiname; ein dorn,
ein stachel im auge: er ist mir ein rechter dorn im auge, sticht mich, thut mir weh im 
auge, ist mir unerträglich; er ist mir in den ougen nicht ein dorn (ich habe ihn sehr 
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lieb). MS. 1, 16b; [...]” (Bd. 1, Sp. 793). Ten years before they met, Celan would 
liked to have sent Heidegger his poem “Schliere im Aug” (GW 1, 159; cf. Lyon,
Paul Celan and Martin Heidegger, pp. 66, 95); but whether he did send it or not,
is not known, I’m afraid.
35 “Besetzbarkeit/ Die Form – Leer<Hohl >form – des Gedichts, ist das auf das Gedicht  
wartende Herz des Dichters. – ” (TCA/Meridian, Ms. 504=777 [”ab 19.8.60”].)
36 Cf. Lyon, Paul Celan and Martin Heidegger, p. 179. Franz Rosenzweig and 
his book Der Stern der Erlösung (1921) would seem to be the obvious direc-
tion to pursue.
37 As Axel Gellhaus remarks, it would not necessarily have been indiscrete of 
Baumann to have mentioned Heidegger’s well-meaning wish to Celan or even 
to cite the letter (“... seit ein Gespräch wir sind ...,” p. 6). In a certain sense, this 
“drink from the well” also echoes a certain constantly ﬂowing “rhetoric” of wells 
and sources in Heidegger (whose “rhetoricity” Heidegger would deny). See for 
instance the sentence Celan had underlined in “Wozu Dichter?” almost ﬁ fteen 
years earlier: “Schaﬀen bedeutet: schöpfen” (La bibliothèque philosophique, p. 364, no.
389; Heidegger, Holzwege [Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1950], p. 275). On the 
English expression “to drink the waters,” cf. e.g. OED, entry “drink, v. [1b]” (� e 
Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed. 1989, OED Online, Oxford University Press,
OED Online, 4 July 2007, <http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50069929>).
38 �at is, just a month after “May ’68.” When they discussed the Paris unrest,
Heidegger spoke very approvingly of the student revolutionaries and their at-
tempt to “br[eak] down ossiﬁed social and intellectual traditions and institutions 
in France,” and this must have struck Celan very positively. To use Lyon’s para-
phrase of Otto Pöggeler’s account, “Celan claimed that conversations with the 
thinker helped him see this revolution in the proper perspective” (Paul Celan and 
Martin Heidegger, p. 205; cf. Pöggeler, Der Stein hinterm Aug, pp. 173–174).
39 Cf. Pöggeler, Der Stein hinterm Aug, p. 163; cf. also France-Lanord, pp. 122,
189.
40 Gellhaus concludes his essay with this laconic remark: “Celan decided other-
wise [Celan entschied sich anders].”  But let us not make a symbolical Blumen-
sprache out of all this dialectic or dialogue of waters and ﬂowers. (I hope this 
“mixed metaphor” is not too sarcastic or morbid. Actually I ﬁnd in the line “Or-
chis und Orchis, einzeln” to be an instance of Celanian humour, very delicate, pro-
found, and dark.)
41 Heidegger’s letter to Celan is dated January 30, 1968; it is cited and translated 
by James K. Lyon, in Paul Celan and Martin Heidegger, p. 189.
42 � e verb zuschweigen is actually brieﬂy listed in the Grimm dictionary, but 
only as a synonym to zuhören, which means just approximately attentive “listen-
ing to” (DWB, Bd. 32, Sp. 817). Derrida has told of the very few words he ever 
exchanged with Celan; actually they seem to have exchanged more books than 
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spoken words. But the dedications in these books conﬁrmed their silent friend-
ship, in spite of the long pauses which might have been interpreted in a rather 
negative way, and which indeed made Derrida  anxious (“La langue n’appartient 
pas : Entretien avec Évélyne Grossman,” in Europe, vol. 79, no. 861–862 [Paul 
Celan] [ Jan.–Feb. 2001], pp. 81–91, here pp 81–83; En. trans. � omas Dutoit 
and Philippe Romanski, “Language is never owned,” in Derrida, Sovereignties in 
Question. �e Poetics of Paul Celan, ed. �omas Dutoit and Outi Pasanen [New
York: Fordham U.P., 2005], pp. 97–107, here pp. 97ﬀ ). But cf. also “To Forgive”:
“Must forgiveness pass through words or must it pass [beyond] words? [...] Can 
one only forgive or ask forgiveness when speaking or sharing the language of the 
other, that is to say, by already identifying suﬃciently with the other for this, and,
by identifying with the other, making forgiveness both possible and impossible? 
Must one refuse the experience of forgiveness to whoever does not speak? Or, on 
the contrary, must one make silence the very element of forgiveness, if there is 
such a thing?” (p. 47). A little later in the text, Derrida aﬃ  rms that “one cannot 
deny this possibility, even this necessity of extra-verbal forgiveness” (p. 48).
43 Cf. e.g. TCA/Meridian, Ms. 604, 612, 472/44; on schweigen, anschweigen cf.
Ms. 513: “So Gedichte schreiben, daß sie wenn nicht auf unser Sprechen, so doch auf
unser Schweigen, auf unser Mit-dem-Genannten-Mitschweigen gestimmt bleiben;
so daß wir nur als Mitlaute ein fremdestes Du anschweigen – und ihm eine Chance
geben” (Celan’s emphasis, here in roman type). �e verb form totzuschweigende
in the poem “Lichtenbergs Zwölf ” (TCA/Atemwende, pp. 156–157), written in 
May 1965, is a construct which has nothing to do with zuschweigen, while the 
poem does seem to refer obliquely to Heidegger, too.
44 A few lines later, before the ﬁ nal greeting (“In freundschaftlichem Gedenken”),
Heidegger added: “And my wishes?/ �at at the appropriate hour you will hear 
the language in which what is to come forth as poetry speaks to you [Und 
meine Wünsche?/ Dass sie zur gegebenen Stunde die Sprache hören, in der sich Ihnen 
das zu Dichtende zusagt]” (cit. and trans. Lyon, pp. 189–190). � is happens to 
correspond rather faithfully to what Celan had written years earlier, in a letter 
to Werner Weber (March 26, 1960), concerning his translation of Valéry’s “Je-
une Parque”: “it was, if I may let my words be accompanied by Martin Heide-
gger’s, a waiting for the speaking of language [es war, wenn ich hier ein Wort Mar-
tin Heideggers mitsprechen lassen darf, ein Warten auf den Zuspruch der Sprache]”
(Celan’s letter has been cited by Axel Gellhaus in Gellhaus et al., Fremde Nähe.
Celan als Übersetzer [Marbach: Deutsche Schillergesellschaft, 1997], p. 398. Cf.
also Lyon, p. 78). It takes some bad faith to read Heidegger’s letter of thanks as 
nothing but a frustrating elusion, indicating feigned ignorance concerning the 
poet’s very distinct hope.
45 “Radix, Matrix,” in Die Niemandsrose (GW 1, 239); trans. John Felstiner:
“Who,/ who was it, that/ stock, that murdered one, that one/ standing black
into heaven:/ rod and testis –?// (Root./ Root of Abraham. Root of Jesse. No
One’s/ root – O/ ours” (Selected Poems and Prose of Paul Celan, p. 167).Trans. Mi-
chael Hamburger: “Who,/ who was it, that/ lineage, the murdered, that looms/ 
black into the sky:/ rod and bulb? [etc.]” (Poems of Paul Celan, p. 165).
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46 Werner Hamacher, “�e Second of Inversion: Movements of a Figure through 
Celan’s Poetry,” trans. William D. Jewett, in Yale French Studies, No. 69 (1985):
‘�e Lesson of Paul de Man’, pp. 276-311, here pp. 295ﬀ.; original German ver-
sion in Hamacher et al., Paul Celan (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1988), pp. 81–
126, here pp. 101ﬀ.; cf. also Gellhaus, “... seit ein Gespräch wir sind ...,” p. 8.
47 Cf. Heidegger, “Wozu Dichter?” in Holzwege (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1950),
p. 251; cit. Celan, La bibliothèque philosophique, p. 363, no. 377.
48 Schibboleth – pour Paul Celan (Paris: Galilée, 1986), p. 96; En. trans. Joshua 
Wilner, revised by �omas Dutoit, in Derrida, Sovereignties in Question, ed. Du-
toit and Outi Pasanen (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), p. 53.
49 Cf. TCA/Meridian, Endf. 33. Rodolphe Gasché sums up Heidegger’s view as 
follows: “For the logos is nothing like an abstract universal; it manifests itself al-
ways (es gibt) and only in an extreme singularity (schärfster Vereinzelung)” (“On 
the Nonadequate Trait,” trans. [from French] Leonard Lawlor, in Of Minimal 
�ings. Studies on the Notion of Relation [Stanford: Stanford U.P., 1999], pp. 195–
220, here p. 210).
50 On the aporetic “logic of givingtaking,” and the apriorical necessities of being 
“forgiven the gift,” and not only the necessity of being forgiven “for not giving,
for never giving enough,” as well as the fact that “one would even have to be for-
given forgiveness,” namely for the mastery and sovereignty implied by the pow-
er of granting forgiveness, cf. e.g. “To Forgive,” p. 22 (Pardonner, pp. 9–10). Cf.
also “Hostipitality,” in Acts of Religion, trans. Gil Andijar (London: Routledge,
2002), pp.  358–420, here p. 386. Cf. also Amos Friedland, “Evil and Forgive-
ness: Transitions,” in Perspectives on Evil and Human Wickedness Vol. 1 No. 4 | 
29 (2004; online at <http://www.wickedness.net/ejv1n4/friedland_amos.pdf>;
accessed Nov. 18, 2006), pp. 24–47.
51 Cf. Donner la mort (Paris: Galilée, 1999), pp. 182–183: “‘Pardonne-moi de te
pardonner’, voilà une phrase qu’il est impossible de réduire au silence dans tout pardon,
et d’abord parce qu’elle s’attribue coupablement une souveraineté.” I wonder whether 
there is not an error in Derrida’s text: the feminin relative pronoun elle seems 
to refer to “une phrase,” namely to the sentence “Pardonne-moi de te pardonner,” 
although it would seem to apply, ﬁrst of all at least, to “tout pardon,” “[le] par-
don,” namely the initial act of forgiveness for which we must thus, implicitly or 
explicit ly, ask for forgiveness. And of course, also the inverse is true (cf. p. 183).
52 Cf. Heidegger, “Wozu Dichter?,” in Holzwege (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann,
1950), pp. 286–287; cit. Celan, La bibliothèque philosophique, p. 364, no. 394;
Heidegger, Wegmarken (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1996 [1st ed. 1967]), pp.
333, 355–356, 358.
53 Vladimir Jankélévitch, Forgiveness, p. 162: “Fortunately, nothing ever has the 
last word! Fortunately, the last word is always the penultimate word... so that the 
debate between forgiveness and the unforgivable will never have an end.”
54 TCA/Sprachgitter, p. 91. Michael Hamburger’s translation: “Came, came./ 
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Came a word, came,/ came through the night,/ wanted to shine, wanted to 
shine.// Ash./ Ash, ash./ Night./ Night-and-night. – Go/ to the eye, the moist 
one” (Poems of Paul Celan [2002], p. 119). Felstiner’s translation is almost iden-
tical, except for the plural “ashes” and the line “would glisten, would glisten” (Se-
lected Poems and Prose of Paul Celan, p. 123).
55 �ere is also the very important and remarkable Feldweggespräch dialogue in 
the book Gelassenheit (1960), which Celan also possessed, but seems to have pur-
chased and read only as late as 1964 (cf. La bibliothèque philosophique, pp. 338,
355, no. 187). “Der Feldweg,” written in 1949, is reprinted in the 13th volume 
of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe, pp. 87–90. � e word “das »Kuinzige«” (“Dieses 
heitere Wissen ist das das »Kuinzige«”) has been explained by the French transla-
tor André Préault as follows: “Littéralement : « Ce gai savoir est das Kuinzige. »
Ce terme dialectal, propre à la Souabe du Sud (où se trouve Messkirch, ville natale 
de Heidegger), correspond étymologiquement à keinnützig, « bon à rien », « propre à 
rien », dont le sens est passé à celui d’ « espiègle », « malicieux », et ﬁ nalement désigne 
aujourd’hui un état de sérénité libre et joyeux, aimant à se dissimuler, marqué par une 
ironie aﬀectueuse et par une touche de mélancolie : mélancolie souriante, sagesse qui ne 
se livre qu’à mots couverts. (Renseignements fournis par l ’auteur)” (Questions III et 
IV [Paris: Gallimard, 1990]).
56 Gellhaus (“seit wir ein Gespräch sind...,” p. 8) cites Heidegger’s letter in re-
sponse to Marcuse from Rüdiger Safranski, Ein Meister aus Deutschland. Hei-
degger und seine Zeit (München, 1994), pp. 483f. �is letter has also been pub-
lished in volume 16 of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe (pp. 430–431). Here is the 
paragraph in question: “Ein Bekenntnis nach 1945 war mir unmöglich, weil die 
Nazianhänger in der widerlichsten Weise ihren Gesinnungswechsel bekundeten, ich 
aber mit ihnen nichts gemein hatte.” An English translation, by Richard Wolin,
of the Heidegger-Marcuse correspondence of 1947–1948, which scandalously 
distorts one of the sentences in this letter, has appeared in New German Critique, 
no. 53 (Spring/Summer 1991), pp. 28–32, here pp. 30–31. Wolin outrageously 
misconstrues the beginning of the following paragraph in Heidegger’s reply to 
Marcuse: “Zu den schweren berechtigten Vorwürfen, die Sie aussprechen ‘über ein Re-
gime, das Millionen von Juden umgebracht hat, das den Terror zum Normalzustand 
gemacht hat und alles, was ja wirklich mit dem Begriﬀ Geist und Freiheit u. Wahrheit 
verbunden war, in sein Gegenteil verkehrt hat’, kann ich nur hinzufügen, daß statt 
‘Juden’ ‘Ostdeutsche’ zu stehen hat und dann genauso gilt für einen der Alliierten, mit 
dem Unterschied, daß alles, was seit 1945 geschieht, der Weltöﬀentlichkeit bekannt ist,
während der blutige Terror der Nazis vor dem deutschen Volk tatsächlich geheimge-
halten worden ist.” �e paragraph is problematic enough even without Wolin’s
erroneous pseudotranslation, here signalled with italics: “To the charges of du-
bious validity that you express ‘about a regime that murdered millions of Jews,
that made terror into an everyday phenomenon, and that turned everything that 
pertains to the ideas of spirit, freedom and truth into its bloody opposite,’ I can 
merely add that if instead of ‘Jews’ you had written ‘East Germans’ [i.e., Ger-
mans of the eastern territories], then the same holds true for one of the allies,
with the diﬀerence that everything that has occurred since 1945 has become 
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public knowledge, while the bloody terror of the Nazis in point of fact had been 
kept a secret from the German people” (trans. Wolin). �e original phrase “Zu 
den schweren berechtigten Vorwürfen, [...]” has nothing to do with the negation-
ist innuendo that Wolin imposes upon Heidegger. Had the text read schwerlich 
berechtigten, or even schwer berechtigten, it could have been rendered as “of dubi-
ous validity,” but “Zu den schweren berechtigten Vorwürfen, die Sie aussprechen [...]”
must be rendered altogether diﬀerently: “To the grave, justiﬁed accusations that 
you express [...].”Whatever one may think of Heidegger’s reply as a whole or in 
part, Wolin’s error is scandalous. It is in any case not a question of a “typograph-
ical error.” In a recent article also published in NGC, Robert Kaufman has cor-
rected Wolin’s translation (“To the serious legitimate charges that you express 
[...]”), and diplomatically adds the following footnote: “Wolin, Heidegger Con-
troversy, 163; Marcuse, Technology, War, and Fascism, 266 (where the text reads,
apparently in typographical error, ‘To the charges of dubious validity that you 
express...’)” (“Poetry’s Ethics? �eodor W. Adorno and Robert Duncan on Aes-
thetic Illusion and Sociopolitical Delusion,” in the New German Critique, Vol.
33, No. 1, Winter 2006, pp. 73–118, here pp. 84–85). Wolin himself sent me an 
electronic mail, after I had contacted NGC, and explained the “translation error”
by the fact that he had commissioned the translation from some “graduate stu-
dent” and “must have missed this point in reviewing his work” (personal  e-mail 
from Richard Wolin, December 6, 2006).
57 TCA/Sprachgitter, p. 5. Trans. John Felstiner: “Jacob’s voice:// � e tears./ � e 
tears in a brother’s eye./ One stayed clinging, grew./ We dwell inside./ Breathe,
that/ it come loose” (Selected Poems and Prose, p. 91).
58 Martin Buber, Tales of the Hasidim: �e Early Masters, trans. Olga Marx [New
York: Schocken Books, 1968], pp. 185–186. � e citation in extenso reads as fol-
lows in the original German: “Es heißt [Sohar II, 12], ‘die Erlösung komme nicht,
ehe die Tränen Esaus Versiegt sind’. Flehen doch die Kinder Israels Tag und Nacht 
um Erbarmen – sollen ihre Tränen umsonst geweint sein, solang auch die Kinder Es-
aus weinen? Aber die Tränen Esaus, damit sind nicht die Tränen gemeint, die die 
Völker weinen und ihr nicht weint, sondern das sind die Tränen, die ihr allesamt, ihr 
Menschen, weint, wenn ihr etwas für euch begehrt und darum bittet. Und wahrlich,
Messias, Sohn Davids, kommt nicht, ehe diese Tränen versiegt sind und ihr weinet,
weil die Schechina verbannt ist und daß ihre Erlösung geschehe” (Die Erzählungen 
der Chassidim, 11th ed. [Zürich: Manesse, 1990], p. 307).
59 Trans. John Felstiner, in Selected Poems and Prose, p. 405; GW 3, 192; TCA-Me-
ridian, “Endfassung,” section 18c.
60 Cf. Derrida’s Schibboleth on this theme of “the date.”
EoE_book.indb   170 9.2.2010   20:47:37
